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This research project was designed to demonstrate one
way in which the U.S. Coast Guard could begin to develop a
clear and effective strategy in its effort to increase black
participation in its officer corps. An organization develop-
ment change model is used as a framework to examine Coast
Guard affirmative action for black officers. In using the
model, developed by Beckhard and Harris in Organizational
Transitions (1977) , a "present state" and a desired "future
state" of Coast Guard affirmative action is detailed. Areas
examined for both the present and future states include the
Coast Guard's general policy on affirmative action, the
organizational climate, the recruitment practices, the selec-
tion process, and promotion and assignment policies. While
recognizing the Coast Guard's task of developing an equitable
posture toward equal opportunity is not an easy one, recommen-
dations and conclusions offer suggestions for how the Coast
Guard can make the transition from the present state to a
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I. INTRODUCTION
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange
an affirmative action program in a racially
neutral way and have it successful ... In order
to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way.
And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot -
we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause
perpetrate racial supremacy.
Supreme Court Justice Blackmun,
* 1978
A. THE PROBLEM
Current and past equal opportunity programs have not
substantially increased the number of blacks in the officer
corps of the United States Coast Guard. Not many Coastguards-
men have served under black officers, and not many will in
the near term unless the Coast Guard changes some of its pre-
sent equal opportunity and affirmative action strategy.
This research project aims at developing a strategy for
increasing black participation in the Coast Guard officer
corps. It does so for two reasons:
1) The present underutilization of blacks in the Coast
Guard continues to reflect the social and economic conditions
of inequality which blacks have been subjected to for so long.
2) Fuller black participation in the officer corps is needed,
and will be even more needed in the future.
Coast Guard equal opportunity statistics, as measured by
black officer reDresentation in the Coast Guard, have not

significantly changed despite the existence of equal opportunity
programs over the past several years. For example, in 1975
the percent of black officers in the Coast Guard was 1.0.
There were 43 black officers in a commissioned corps size of
4,264. In May 1979 it was 1.3. There were 63 black officers
in a commissioned officer corps of 4,372. In both years there
was a disproportionate number of black officers serving in the
lower ranks. [DOT computer center Minority Status Report, 31
Dec. 1975 and DOT computer center Report #06238HR03, 31 May
1979] The numbers themselves are prima facie evidence of past
racial discrimination. But discrimination is not the issue
in this thesis - overcoming its effects is .
Do these statistics represent a problem for the Coast Guard?
Does it matter that black representation in the officer corps
is extremely low with little promise for change? These are
critical questions the Coast Guard faces. The answer to
both of these is, unequivocally, yes and this research project
attempts to explain why.
An implicit goal of Coast Guard equal opportunity programs
is to establish a future Coast Guard which reflects racial
balance throughout its hierarchy and has an organizational
climate which accepts diversity. However, too slow a pace
toward accomplishing this goal may seriously hamper the Coast
Guard's ability to perform its missions.
The Coast Guard's present course in affirmative action
appears ill-advised. If it does not adopt a proactive,
10

voluntary stance in the officer corps, it may be ordered to
perform affirmative action at someone else's discretion.
Affirmative action may be imposed by the courts or the execu-
tive branch on their terms and at their pace. But if the Coast
Guard adopted a more favorable approach to affirmative action,
while it has time to be more selective, it could perhaps avoid
negative consequences and keep the management of its personnel
policies entirely in its own hands.
The oressure for equal opportunities for minorities con-
tinues to grow in all areas of government. The head of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Eleanor Norton, indi-
cated that the government is worse than private industry when
it comes to giving job opportunities to minorities and women.
"For the first time in history, the federal sector does not
outperform the private sector" in affirmative action. Ms.
Holmes vowed to change the government's employment record
under a presidential order. [Monterey Peninsula Herald , 6
Sept. 1979] Soon after taking office, the new Secretary of
Transportation, Neil Goldschmidt, cited the Transportation
*
Department for its poor record on affirmative action. [LCDR
Smith, 1979] It would not be a surprise to see in the near
future large corporations (e.g., Sears, Kaiser, etc.) banding
together to pressure the government into regulating itself
*
The Coast Guard was shifted from the Treasury Department
to the Department of Transportation in 1967.
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more stringently in affirmative action, partly in return for
the extreme pressure to which they have been subjected to
by the government over the last decade.
As a result of this growing pressure, an edict of affirma-
tive action could be imposed by the President, Secretary of
Transportation, or Congressional action in the not too distant
future. If this occurred, the Coast Guard's option to further
develop its own voluntary affirmative action program would be
eliminated and it might be told to arbitrarily increase its
level of black participation in the officer corps.
Second, the present selection processes (Officer Candidate
School and Coast Guard Academy) are vulnerable to court action,
especially if the courts were to use selection guidelines
already established for civilian institutions, the Bakke case
notwithstanding. The Coast Guard's emphasis on a merit pro-
cess, when in fact the examinations have not been validated
for blacks, may prove discriminatory. This is true even though
the sample size of black Coast Guard officers has not been
sufficiently large for validity studies. [Fry, 1979, LCDR Smith,
1979] Rejecting qualified or qualifiable blacks now from the
officer corps because they are not "best qualified" according
to somewhat subjective and arbitrary criteria, could prove
harmful to the quality of officers in the officer corps in
the future. For example, if strict quotas were forced upon
the officer corps by the courts, as they have been recently
in a Detroit racial case involving its police department [Rowan,
12

1979] , the Coast Guard might be forced to admit far greater
numbers of black officers, some of whom may not be qualified
or qualifiable.
Third, an issue which could seriously impinge on the effec-
tiveness of Coast Guard missions is racial harmony. At present
the black population in the enlisted ranks is 8.4 percent with
a disproportionately heavier concentration of blacks in the
lower ranks [DOT computer Center Report #06238HR03] . In order
to meet overall enlisted recruiting goals, an increased depen-
dence on recruiting blacks appears inevitable. The lack of
black role models in the officer corps vis a vis an increasingly
black enlisted corps makes the disparity in their ratios to
whites a symbol of inequity. The absence of an equitable
number of black officers will influence young enlisted blacks
to view the Coast Guard white leadership as racist. One reason
the Coast Guard has not had a serious racial incident in the
past is due, in part, to its having had so few blacks. How-
ever, the Coast Guard may soon find itself in a position simi-
lar to the Navy's in the early 1970s when racial tension and
flare-ups were common. The spectre of an intensifying backlash
to black opportunities is again on the rise, as evidenced in
part by recent KKK activities both in and out of the military.
This increases the potential for racial unrest in the Coast
Guard.
Fourth, it is likely that young blacks will be less willing
to join organizations whose leadership reflects low black
representation, especially since other organizations, military
13

and civilian, are beginning to demonstrate marked improvement
(e.g., U.S. Army) in their representation of black leadership.
This could adversely affect the Coast Guard's ability to meet
its future manpower requirements.
Changing present equal opportunity and affirmative action
policy and practices may seemingly involve risk, but failure
to take the risk and make needed changes could produce far
greater risks to Coast Guard mission effectiveness in the future
And it must be recognized that affirmative action programs are
critical to achieving equal opportunity goals. Hand in hand
with the realization that affirmative action is a necessary
instrument for needed change is the clear understanding that
there will be consequences, both societal and in-house, for
doing affirmative action well or for not doing it well. These
consequences will be reflected in terms of available labor
resources, political climate, racial harmony, mission effec-
tiveness, etc. The instinct here, without the benefit of a
crystal ball, is that the Coast Guard, for all its advantages
of size and flexibility, can put itself in a relatively attrac-
tive and advantageous position as an employer by vigorously
pursuing affirmative action over the next several years.
Yet the full use of the affirmative action concept in the
Coast Guard has not been openly or favorably endorsed [see
Chapter IV, General Policy-Present State] . As a result a
significant change in the Coast Guard's nearly all white officer
image does not look to be forthcoming. Subtle as they may
14

be, hurdles for black officers in selection, promotion,
assignment, and affiliation still exist.
B. DEFINITIONS
The terms equal opportunity and affirmative action are
often confused and frequently have been used interchangeably.
For example, Herbert Northrup ' s field interviews of people
in the Navy and Marine Corps revealed that few people had a
good understanding of the concept of affirmative action and
usually failed to recognize any difference between the two
terms. Since these two terms are repeatedly used in this
thesis, the following definitions apply for Chapters III
through V.
"A program of equal opportunity deals with eliminating
any racial bias in an institution's criteria for hiring, job
classification, and promotion selection" [Northrup, 1979].
The Coast Guard's new civil rights manual (COMDTINSTRUCTION
M5350.11A) reflects this commitment. However, as Northrup
points out, "the implementation of such a program alone, does
not meet the commitments of affirmative action which are broadly
outlined in ... the regulations of Executive Order 11246."
Affirmative action is then defined as a program which "deals
with recruiting and upgrading minority members of an institution
so that they are represented more proportionally in all paygrades
and occupational categories" [Northrup, 1979]
.
Thus, for purposes of this thesis equal opportunity means
a policy where individuals are not excluded from any employment
15

activity because of race, color, sex, national origin, or
religion. The policy calls for a neutral system of employment
where neither intentional nor unintentional discrimination
occurs. The system is "blind to race." And affirmative action
means taking specific positive and aggressive actions to
enhance the competitive ability of minorities and produce a
situation where races and minorities are represented propor-
tionally in an organization. It means eliminating barriers
that act as obstacles to achieving equal opportuntiy. It also
means evaluating the circumstances with "eyes wide open" and
not being unequivocally "blind to race."
C. PREMISES
The next decade will bring special human resource challenges
(e.g., manpower shortages, demands for equal opportunity, et
al.) [Mills, 1979, Moskos, 1978] which the Coast Guard will
have to be prepared to meet. In response to these challenges
affirmative action goals cannot simply remain a goal. They
must become a reality, and the seeds for achieving affirmative
action goals must be planted now if the Coast Guard is to be
able to truly call itself an equal opportunity employer.
Yet a significant new problem is that the majority of white
Americans now perceives that "equality" has been achieved, and
that past and present programs to improve the status of minori-
ties are giving these groups an unfair and possibly unnecessary
advantage. This is clearly the appeal of the term "reverse
discrimination." Evidencing this view, a 1978 Gallup Poll found
16

that whites ranked the problems of black Americans last on a
list of thirty-one concerns [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]
.
At the heart of this issue are the perceptions and atti-
tudes surrounding the concept of "equality." Equal opportunity
in the Coast Guard emphasizes giving individuals equal treat-
ment. There is little consideration given to equal treatment
for entire groups. This shortcoming should be approached with
affirmative action since equal opportunity programs do not pro-
duce equitable distribution in the near future. (See Chapter
IV, General Policy-Future State for further discussion on
equality.
)
It is a premise of this paper that, today, leadership
rhetoric in the Coast Guard is filled with forceful arguments
for treating everyone equally and for being "colorblind" in
practices and policies. (For examples see the Coast Guard
Civil Rights Manual or Commander, Twelfth Coast Guard District
Affirmative Action Plan.) These arguments are supported on
the "theoretical concepts of equality" while they ignore the
vast differences, i.e., job opportunities for whites and blacks
to gain entrance into the officer corps. In an ideal world
theoretical concepts of equality would be the only tenable
base for personnel policies. But as U.S. Circuit Judge Damon
J. Kieth declared in the Detroit police case, "No one relishes
racial classifications, however, until our society progresses





The Commandant, Admiral John B. Hayes, recently suggested
that three management premises be considered:
1) Don't be bound by our own rules; if we
wrote the book we can change it when reason
indicates or apply it with discretion.
2) Be bound by law; particularly by its
intent; seek to change the bad law; revise
the poor regulation.
3) Foster innovation; be willing to try
new methods and procedures. Be able to
accept that all will not succeed. [Hayes, 1979]
In consonance with the Commandant's encouragement to foster
innovation, it was felt that applying organization development
concepts to affirmative action for black officers could help
lead to better solutions which would bring the Coast Guard
closer to "the vision of a multi-racial destiny that would
eliminate color as a subject for debate" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence,
1979] . Utilizing an organization change model to focus on
Coast Guard affirmative action can perhaps provide added in-
sight and assistance toward achieving the organizational goal
of true and complete equal opportunity.
The organizational change model selected as a strategy for
this research was developed by Richard Beckhard and Reuben T.
Harris in their book Organizational Transitions: Managing
Complex Change (1977) . It is a change model which provides a
detailed blueprint for answering the three questions which the
discipline of organization development typically asks: Where
are we? Where would we like to be? And, how do we get there?
18

Collecting data to help answer these questions involved
conducting interviews with key people in the Coast Guard organi-
zation, and pursuing an extensive literature search on affirma-
tive action, racial issues, and organization development. By
tying these three subjects together it is hoped that this
researcher can influence the Coast Guard strategy for accom-
plishing its important objectives in civil rights, as well as
creating a "felt need" in the Coast Guard to rethink its pre-
sent position on affirmative action.
The organization of the thesis is as follows: Chapter II
is a discussion of affirmative action, what it is, how it
developed, the controversy surrounding it, and why the mili-
tary is reauired to perform it. Chapter III touches on organi-
zation development and describes the framework of the organi-
zational change model used in the principle chapter, Chapter
IV. Chapter IV ' s content includes a description of affirmative
action and equal opportunity programs in the "present state,"
and a proposal for how it might look in the "future state."
Chapter V contains the conclusions and recommendations, especially
as they relate to a "transition state" for getting the Coast
Guard to move smoothly from where it is now in terms of practices
and policies to a position more consistent and effective with




Affirmative action is discussed in a variety of contexts
in this chapter. This is done in an effort to make affirma-
tive action less a mystery and more understandable as a concept.
Supported by some and decried by others, affirmative action
is designed to help overcome a heritage of racial discrimina-
tion. The concept of affirmative action, which has been sub-
ject to continual and intense debate, has endured a long and
slow evolutionary process. It has now reached the point where
it is embroiled in significant controversy.
A. HISTORY
Affirmative action was essentially born out of civil rights
legislation and a series of Presidential executive orders
dating back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. As far back as 1935, the
Wagner Act prescribed "affirmative action" and "cease and desist"
remedies against employers who illegally discriminated against
union members. Although this did not stem from a case involving
minorities or women, it did introduce the general principle
underlying affirmative action. This principle was "that a
court order to cease and desist from some discriminatory prac-
tice may not be sufficient to undo the harm already done, or
even to prevent additional harm as the result of a pattern of
events set in motion by the prior illegal activity" [Sowell, 1977]
Hence, as a result of a non-racial issue, an affirmative action
20

remedy deemed necessary and appropriate for the circumstances
was introduced. In this instance it provided for a reinstate-
ment of unlawfully discharged union employees, with back pay,
plus an imposed requirement on the company to post notices
in a conspicuous location iterating the company's "new"
employment policy toward union members [Sowell, 1977]
.
In the 1960s the principle of affirmative action resurfaced,
this time as a strong alliance to the ongoing effort to elimin-
ate racial discrimination in America. President Kennedy's
issuance of Executive Order 10925 established the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and provided the
first official requirement that federal contractors "will take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin [26 Fed. Reg.
1977, 3CFR, 1959-63 comp. 448, pt 3,301(1) [. Although this
coverage applied only to federal government contracts, it con-
tained the language and reality of affirmative action. The
requirement to pursue affirmative action and depart from the
standard of simply practicing non-discrimination was set in
motion. Thus, in this respect Executive Order 10925 differed
from previous executive orders related to equal opportunity.
It also carried certain sanctions for non-compliance. But,
apart from the fact that it placed emphasis on minority recruit-
ing, it had little real effect in changing the social order
[Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978] . Yet significantly, as the
21

first step, it introduced affirmative action as a prime opera-
tional tactic to bring about equal opportunity.
Although some token changes in employment practices were
made as a result of Executive Order 10925, it was not until
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and subsequent executive orders 11246
and 11375, signed by President Johnson in 1965 and 1967 respec-
tively, that affirmative action began to take on the potential
for substantial impact on society. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 enunciated a national policy of equal employ-
ment opportunity in private employment. "However, it speci-
fically denied any requirement of preferential treatment for
the purpose of curing an imbalance in the racial composition
of a given body of employees or apprentices" [Marino, 1978].
Executive Order 11246 carried over the concept of the
19 64 Civil Rights Act to apply for government contractors,
subcontractors, and the United States government itself. It
also ordered as government policy the promotion of the full
realization of equal employment opportunity through a positive,
continuous program of affirmative action. Executive Order
11375 amended Executive Order 11246 to include prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex. It not only outlaws dis-
crimination but also carries a provision that contractors
develop written affirmative action plans that attempt to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination in our society [Chayes,
1974] . In addition, it had the effect of delegating investi-
gative powers and enforcement procedures to a variety of
federal agencies. Although, on paper this order was most explicit
22

in its affirmative action intent, and contained the most severe
sanctions for non-compliance, it still had minimal effect in
changing the reality of disparity between blacks and whites in
organizations [Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978]
.
Affirmative action was soundly established as a principle
and instrument of social change between 1968 and 1972. Of
particular importance was the passing of the 1972 Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act, which amended and extended Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and the Griggs vs Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). This case decided that "employment tests
or qualifications which screen out minorities or women at a
greater rate than others cannot be used unless the employer
proves that the screening device in question is manifestly
related to the job for which it is used: Such proof must be
in the form of a validation study" [Albrecht and Hall, 1979].
Part of this period's emphasis was a broader focus of affirma-
tive action. It included attention on more systematic prac-
tices of discrimination matched by an understanding of the
basic root causes of discrimination in organizations. As a
result, newer affirmative action programs have surfaced in
various organizations which appear more positive in promoting
equity and fairness [Albrecht and Hall, 1979].
B. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEFINITIONS
Today affirmative action
precisely used, entails government fostered
and voluntary action by public and private
organizations going beyond the cessation of
23

formal discrimination practices. Affirmative
action means more than passive non-discrimination.
It means that various organizations must act
positively, affirmatively and aggressively to
remove all barriers, however informal or subtle,
that prevent access by minorities and women
to their rightful places in the employment and
educational institutions of the United States.
[Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978]
Prior to the 1970s affirmative action meant to actively
advertise opportunities for minorities; it meant to seek out
those not yet qualified and prepare them for better jobs and
educational opportunities. However, in the early 1970s the
meaning of affirmative action developed into more than the
active pursuit of minorities by employers. "It came to mean
the setting of statistical requirements based on race, color,
and national origin for employers and educational institutions"
[Glazer, 1975] .
Another definition for "affirmative action is, as the term
implies, the use of positive, results oriented practices to
ensure that women, minorities, handicapped persons, and other
protected classes of people will be equitably represented in
the organization. Put another way, affirmative action is
any action that is taken specifically to overcome the results
of past discriminatory employment practices [Albrecht and
Hall, 1979] .
C . CONTROVERSY
The theoretical justification of any affirmative
action program rests on the realization that
certain groups of individuals have been victimized
by past discriminatory activities, and special




Prior to the decade of the 1970s few white males perceived
minorities as a threat to their status. Societal programs
to bring about equality were generally accepted, perhaps
because they had no real impact on changing the social picture.
Yet during the time frame when affirmative action was gaining
an effective foothold, 1964-1974, many white males began to
perceive the minority as a threat. Out of this perception was
born the concept of "reverse discrimination." It surfaced as
a result of a demand for equal opportunity being translated
into a demand for equality of results through affirmative
action. The controversy, oversimplified, boils down to society's
asking "to what extent, if any, should one group be discriminated
against (through reverse discrimination) in society's attempt
to provide equal opportunities for another group" [Rosen, 1975]
.
At one extreme affirmative action is considered to be
tantamount to racial, sexual, and ethnic discrimination while
at the other extreme, the lack of implementation of affirmative
action is regarded as perpetuating the illusive aspects of the
American dream of eoual opportunity. But many Americans lie
in between these extremes and for the most part do not under-
stand the difference between non-discrimination and affirmative
action [Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978]
.
Nathan Glazer has presented an argument in his book
Affirmative Discrimination (1974) that the present course in
affirmative action policies is making matters worse. "The new
course threatens the abandonment of our concern for individual
25

claims to consideration on the basis of justice and equity,
now to be replaced with a concern for rights for publicly
determined and delimited groups." Glazer further points out
that supporters of the new policies, i.e., requirements for
statistical parity between racial and ethnic groups, argue that
they are only temporary ones, ones needed to overcome the
prolonged history of discrimination in America. Glazer does not
agree with this line of thinking fearing that the present course
in affirmative action policies will become permanent. Instead,
he feels that
compensation for the past is a dangerous princi-
ple. It can be extended indefinitely and make
for endless trouble. Who is to determine what
is proper compensation for the American Indian,
the black, the Mexican American, the Chinese
or Japanese American? When it is established
that the full status of eauality is extended
to every individual, regardless of race, color,
or national origin, one has done all that jus-
tice and equity call for and that is consistent
with a harmonious multigroup society. [Glazer, 1974]
Joel Dreyfuss and Charles Lawrence argue differently in
their book, The Bakke Case .
A fundamental difference between blacks and
whites lay in their different concepts of the
role that government should play in their lives.
The expression of middle-class sentiment in
Proposition 13 had its applications in Bakke
as well. At its core was a racial difference in
perceptions of America. Most whites believed
that our major racial problems had been solved,
but most blacks did not. Justice Marshall,
in arguing that the melting pot had not worked
for blacks, reflected that minority perception.
Without a national consensus to provide energy
and momentum, the movement toward equality was
stalled. Opponents of race-sensitive measures
saw the country as a collection of competing
ethnic groups whose only rights were individual
26

and whose achievements were simply the result
of merit. Such a vision of America was com-
forting to those in the best position to reap
the benefits of privilege. [Dreyfuss and
Lawrence, 1979]
In their verv next paragraph, Dreyfuss and Lawrence begin
to point out the disturbing signs of complacency and intoler-
ance which they see evident in America * today.
Racial minorities would find it difficult, in
light of their own experiences, to accept such
a picture of America. As long as opportunities
were color-coded, there was a contradiction between
the comfortable mythology of the meritocracy and
the realities of American life. The sharp
racial differences in life expectancy, medical
care, income, job categories, education, and
political power all were a part of that reality.
Those who argued for improved educational
opportunities rather than more drastic adjustments
were ignoring disparities that went beyond differ-
ences in schooling. How would they explain that
white high school dropouts had lower unemployment
rates than black youths with some college education
or that the economic gap between blacks and whites
was widening despite growing numbers of blacks
in higher education? The experience of professional
schools and corporations had shown that qualifications
was not such an easy term to define. A very real
resistance to affirmative action came from a
justifiable fear of competition. Just as whites
wanted to narrow the competitive field as much as
possible, minorities saw they needed government
intervention to get a fair share. [Dreyfuss and
Lawrence, 1979]
As a result of a combination of the many legal decisions
requiring affirmative action, confusion over their interpre-
tation, and a subtle undercurrent of racism, a backlash erupted
in the 1970s. A significant perception generated in the white
male community was that whites were now being discriminated
against since they felt they no longer could compete evenly





In 1975 it was suggested that the equal employment oppor-
tunity movement had reached its moment of truth. "Its
seemingly irresistable forces of social justice and human
rights now confront the equally immovable barriers of job
performance necessities and constitutional rights" [Lopez,
1975]
.
Many American institutions have felt caught in the middle
of this squeeze. Up until the Brian Weber Supreme Court deci-
*
sion companies felt, and probably still do to a large extent,
that they were being squeezed from several directions. On
the one hand if they moved voluntarily to correct imbalances
they ran the risk of reverse discrimination suits by white
males, like Weber's. On the other hand if they failed to act,
special interest groups, representing a variety of causes might
challenge the lack of affirmative action implementation through
lawsuits, job bias charges, etc., and, more importantly, the
government could withhold important federal contracts. Com-
panies also often felt confused by the pile of conflicting,
overlapping, and complex federal and state directives which
emanated from numerous federal and state agencies [Rowan, 1978]
,
*
Brian Weber sued Kaiser Aluminum because less senior
minorities were being selected over him for advanced training
as part of Kaiser's affirmative action program. The actual
issue was this: When may a company and/or union voluntarily
take action based on race to remedy racial injustices of the
past? Weber lost the case in the Supreme Court when it ruled
5-2 in favor of affirmative action principles in 1978.
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Now that the Brian Weber case has been resolved by the
Supreme Court, some companies fear that the government has
license to "tighten the screws." The fear is that the effect
of the decision may increase the demand for numerical goals
and timetables and that it has removed barriers which reluc-
tant employers have been choosing to hide behind [Lehner
and Falk, 1979]
.
Some of the Supreme Court Justices 1 opinions in the Weber
case are worth noting. Justice Brennan, relying on the "spirit"
of the job-bias provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act said
"It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation's
concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to
improve the lot" of those who had been victims "constituted
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy." Further, "the majority
opinion made clear that a racial preference in private employ-
ment is permissible wherever there are manifest racial imbalances
in traditionally segregated job categories." And finally,
Justice Blackmun explained that the court "considers a job
category to be 'traditionally segregated' when there has been
a societal history of purposeful exclusion of blacks from the
job category, resulting in a persistent disparity between the
proportion of blacks in the labor force and the proportion of




Certainly the controversy surrounding affirmative action
is complex and value laden. Questions of consistency, fairness,
and justice are continuously being asked. Regardless, affirma-
tive action laws are in existence to guide American institu-
tions, but apparently a major stumbling block to affirmative
action implementation is the failure of many U.S. institutions
to breathe life into these laws already on the books. The
lack of compliance with the laws and guidelines on affirmative
action by public and private institutions alike continues to
be a frustrating anchor on any significant movement in many
affirmative action programs.
D. NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Affirmative action has not existed without its negative
effects. Both blacks and whites have criticized affirmative
action for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most significant
criticism of affirmative action is that it lends people the
impression that minorities and women receive their jobs or
status in the organization as a result of affirmative action,
that any "hard-earned achievements are simply conferred bene-
fits" [Sowell, 1978]. This attitude has deleterious conse-
quences. It perpetuates negative assumptions that many whites
hold about the relative competence and intelligence of women,
minorities, and in particular, of blacks.
Another criticism is generated by Felix M. Lopez. He
states that affirmative action policies are creating more
problems than they are trying to solve:
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A careful and dispassionate analysis of current
events suggest that the present mish-mash of selec-
tion guidelines, affirmative action plans, fair
employment legislation, civil service regulations,
labor agreements, and company personnel practices,
not only hinders the finding of a solution but
actually aggravates the problem. [Lopez, 1975]
E. MILITARY
In general the military services have adopted an equal oppor-
tunity stance which attempts to embody the spirit of fair treatment
and equal opportunity by strict application of equal treatment
policies for all individuals. This posture essentially follows
the non-discrimination guidelines set down by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1972 Amendment to that act,
and Executive Order 11246. In 1970 Executive Order 11246
(originally issued in 1965) and its implementing regulations
were extended to cover all the Department of Defense Armed
Forces by the Code of Frederal Regulations [32 CFR 191.1,
1976] . (This does not include the Coast Guard since the Coast
Guard is an agency in the Department of Transportation.) One
of the implementing requirements of Executive Order 11246 is
that agencies shall take affirmative action to correct prob-
lems of minority underutilization. "To be in concert with
these laws as they have been interpreted, the services public
policies must afford minorities every available opportunity
to develop their abilities and to achieve the highest position
commensurate with their abilities, and must aim at making
minority representation in all positions reflect those minorities'
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representation in the nation" [Northrup, 1979] . 32 CFR part
191 makes it very clear that the DOD military departments are
required to practice affirmative action. The Coast Guard's
legislative requirement to practice affirmative action is
less specific. Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as amended requires all federal agencies to maintain an affirma-
tive program of equal employment opportunity. However, as a
result of other federal policy guidelines, it is apparent
that the Coast Guard should be using affirmative action guide-




The affirmative action concept has evolved due to society's
slow progress in bringing minorities into the mainstream of
American economic and social life. It is not a popular con-
cept; many white males regard it as a threat and point to
reverse discrimination for argument and support. The courts
have continued to interpret its use as an instrument for social
change but it remains a subject for heated discussion and
intense debate. It has changed the social order in some
respects, but it also has been criticized for being counter-
productive as well. Yet in spite of all its controversy,
faults, criticism, etc., it is the law of the land; all
government agencies are required to perform it.
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III. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT AND THE MODEL
This chapter introduces and describes an organization
development (OD) change model which is useful as a framework
for diagnosing where problems exist and what kinds of changes
are needed in organizations. In particular, this model will
be used in the following chapter to examine certain dimensions
of Coast Guard equal opportunity and affirmative action.
Using this model may prove beneficial to the Coast Guard in
managing the "change process - 'the transition state' - moving
from today's condition to some desired future state" [Beck-
hard and Harris, 1977] , in its eaual opportunity and affirma-
tive action programs.
A. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT (OD)
When paired with the powerful tools and concepts of OD,
equal ODportunity and affirmative action goals have a better
chance of being accepted and achieved. Choosing to focus on
Coast Guard equal opportunity and affirmative action for offi-
cers in an OD context offers promise for the Coast Guard to
produce more tangible and measurable results. The potential
impact for OD to guide organizations toward becoming more
"human" and effective is enormous. Chris Argyris says that
"at the heart of organization development is the concern for
the vitalizing, energizing, actualizing, activating, and





According to Edgar Huse organization development "is a
newly emerging discipline directed toward using behavioral
science knowledge to assist organizations to adjust more
rapidly to change" [Huse, 1975] . Richard Beckhard defines OD
as a total system, planned change effort "based on behavioral
science knowledge; it is managed from the top, and it is
organization wide in its approach. It is concerned with the
development, change, and improvement of system and subsystem.
It is focused on and closely related to short- and medium-
term organization mission goals; its aim is to increase
organization health and effectiveness" [Beckhard, 1969]
.
More recently French and Bell explain OD as a "planned, syste-
matic process in which applied behavioral science principles
and practices are introduced into an ongoing organization
toward the goals of effecting organization improvement, greater
organizational competence, and greater organizational effec-
tiveness" [French and Bell, 1978]
.
An example of "organization effectiveness" is given by
Gardner. He describes it as a process of "self renewal" and
it contains five rules:
1) The first rule is that the organization must have an
effective program for the recruitment and development of
talent.
2) The second rule for the organization capable of continu-
ous renewal is that it must be a hospitable environment for
the individual.




4) The fourth rule is that there must be fluidity in the
internal structure.
5) The fifth rule is that the organization must have some
means of combatting the process by which men become prisoners
of their procedures. [Gardner, 1965]
1 . Systems Theory
Particularly relevant to organization development is
the concept that organizations are systems and that systems
theory plays an important function in the assumptions of
organization development. "Using a systems approach, OD has
grown rapidly in response to a need - the need for organiza-
tions to remain viable and to survive in a world of change"
[Huse, 1975] . The use of a systems approach is now a major
component of organization development, and organizations are
typically viewed in OD as open social systems.
a social organization has a number of highly
interdependent and interrelated subsystems.
Second, a social system is not only open, but
also highly dynamic, being characterized by
inputs, operations, outputs, boundaries, and
feedback. Third, a social system uses both
positive and negative feedback in an attempt
to achieve balance. Fourth, a social system
is characterized by a wide multiplicity of
objectives, purposes, and functions which may,
at times, be in conflict. [Huse and Bowditch, 1973]
A system can be defined as "a series of interrelated
and interdependent parts, such that the interaction or inter-
play of any of the subsystems (parts) affects the whole"
[Huse and Bowditch, 1973] . Utilizing the systems concept,
French and Bell view organizations "as consisting of a number
of significant interacting variables which cut across or are
common to all subunits. These variables have to do with
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goals, tasks, technology, human-social organization, structure,
and external interface relationships" [French and Bell, 1978].
Figure 1 illustrates French and Bell's description of major
organizational subsystems.
In essence, system theory permits clearer understanding
and better appreciation for the dynamics of change in organizaa-
tions. It is a powerful concept which is useful in asking
meaningful questions of the organization and in planning
change strategies. "Without the system concept, we tend to
see problems (and solutions) in isolation, without recognizing
their impact on the total organization as a total system com-
posed of interdependent and interrelated parts" [Huse, 1975]
.
Perhaps its usefulness is more easily recognized when
highlighting several consequences of viewing a social organi-
zation from a systems point of view:
1) One of the most important consequences of viewing
organizations from a systems point of view is the realization
that a change in one of the subsystems will have an impact
on all of the other subsystems.
2) A second consequence is the understanding that reducing
role ambiguity should enhance organizational effectiveness
and increase personal satisfaction since researchers have found
that role ambiguity was highly linked with such factors as
employee anxiety, job satisfaction, organizational effective-
ness, and the tendency to quit.
3) A third consequence is... that the systems approach avoids
the "single-cause habit of thinking." It assumes that events
occur as a result of many forces acting in complex relation-
ships to one another.
4) A fourth consequence is the concept of equilibrium. There
is a strong tendency for organizations to maintain equilibrium
and to be conservative in the search for stability. However,
from a systems point of view, equilibrium is necessary to
avoid wild, erratic swings. Nevertheless, unless their system








5) Other consequences of viewing organizations from a
systems approach include the appreciation of the concepts
of function, boundary, and a better understanding of multi-
plicity of purposes, functions and objectives which a total
system can have. [Huse, 1975]
For example, looking at Coast Guard equal opportunity
and affirmative action vis a vis goals, structure, manpower
planning, environmental factors, Congressional influence,
organization climate, etc., and to describe the various forces
interacting on these variables is to approach it from a systems
point of view. The systems approach provides additional insight
into the complexity of the variables in equal opportunity and
affirmative action.
This brief and oversimplified discussion of OD, and
its reliance on systems thoery, provides an appreciation of the
setting from which the organization change model developed.
The model, as it relates to a systems point of view, offers
a manager a specific process for his or her systemwide planning.
If one accepts this concept (open system)
,
planning an effective change stragegy requires:
(1) mapping the environmental forces and
demands; (2) having a clear picture of present
and desired organizational responses to these
demands; (3) having a program of prioritized
activities that are responsive to these demands;
and (4) having a system for assessing the impact
of these demands on the organization's objectives
and activities over time. [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]
The model, as used in the following chapter, addresses these
issues with respect to equal opportunity and affirmative
action. It is a model which gives managers a way of thinking
about planned change and a way to go about it.
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B. THE BECKHARD AND HARRIS MODEL
The model was presented in 1977 as part of a series of
books on organizational development. The authors, Richard
Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris, describe a useful way for a
manager (or consultant) to focus on the tasks he (or she) must
perform to successfully introduce and accomplish desired major
organizational change. Underlying the planned change model
is an emphasis on systems technology. "At the basis of this
latter perspective is the view of an organization as a complex
set of interdependent subsytems - people, structures, tech-
nology, tasks - which are embedded in a dynamic environment
and recognition of the need for developing and maintaining
compatibility among these subsystems" [Beckhard and Harris,
1977] .
The model, in essence, revolves around the concept of
"transition management. " This concept helps the manager to
more effectively manage the change process and includes a
way to accurately analyze the "change" picture and perform
the appropriate actions to successfully accomplish major
organization change. (Appendix A is a flow block diagram -
the Transition Management Planning Model - developed by Reuben
T. Harris, 1979. This model is a systematic presentation of
the sequence of events of the organizational change model
which is explicitly detailed in the Beckhard and Harris book.
It outlines the key processes of the transition state.)
Since the demands of change on organizations are becoming
increasingly complex, Beckhard and Harris advocate as part of
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their model that the manager "needs knowledge, skills, and
technology as never before to help in (1) understanding the
present state of affairs in the organization, (2) developing
relatively clear goals of where he or she wants the organiza-
tion to get to in the intermediate future, (3) producing a
fairly clear picture of a desired state to be achieved by some
specified time, and (4) specifying a clear picture of the state
which must exist during the interim" [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]
Thus, key to Beckhard and Harris's model are the explicit
descriptions the manager must have of the "present state,"
"future state," and "transition state." Each state is seen
as a distinct organizational condition.
1. Present State
In defining the present state the manager (chief execu-
tive officer) has to specifically ask "Where are we?" and be
assured that he is getting accurate answers to his questions.
He must know how his managers are behaving, where his people
are attitudinally , what the problems are, etc.
Defining the present state in one's organization takes
on special importance when a manager has set explicit goals
for a desired future state. He must known where his organiza-
tion "is" on a multitude of dimensions and variables or else
he risks a significant amount of confusion, resistance and
even failure in his attempt to move his organization from the
present state to the future state. Thus, as he relies on
his map of the future, he also must depend on having a clear
perception of how things operate in the present, especially
as they relate to the goals to be accomplished in the future
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tate. Beckhard and Harris ask the following questions of
the present state:
1) What parts of the system are most significantly involved
in the change process?
2) What changes in present attitudes or behaviors or ways
of work would probably have to occur if the desired goal
were to be reached?
3) Which processes need to be changed for the change to be
effective? The processes or variables which need to be
examined include: changes of attitudes required, changes of
practices required, changes of policies, changes of struc-
tures required, and changes of rewards required.
4) What is the "readiness" and "capability" for each sub-
part of the organization to change?
A way to examine the change process in regards to
readiness and capability was developed by David Gleicher who
addressed the "cost of changing." His formula for determining
cost
:
C=(ABD)>X. C=change, A=level of dissatisfaction
with the status quo, B=clear desired state, D=
practical first step« towards desired state, and
X=cost of change. In other words, there has
to be enough dissatisfaction with the current
state of affairs (A) for someone to be mobilized
for change. The various subsystems need to have
clear enough goals (B) ; otherwise the cost (X)
is too high. For each subsystem, there needs
to be some awareness of practical first steps (D)
to move, if movement is to take place. [Beckhard
and Harris, 1977]
If A, B, or D are low then C, the amount of change, will be
low. Using this simple formula can be a practical way for a
manager to discover some of the barriers to the change process
The manager can more easily decide where to begin to attack




After defining the need for change, which more often
than not arises as a result of some external pressure to the
organization, the manager needs to have a clear picture of a
desired future state. He has to be able to visualize the
organization blueprint of the future. This future state is
to be visualized as more than just the result of setting
goals and objectives with the assumption that the desired
future state will then occur. Typically, a future state is
fuzzy to managers; they usually rely on some abstract goals
and often expect them to happen. Beckhard and Harris suggest
that the manager should visualize a future state in an
explicit manner. He must "see" how it looks. He should
be able to describe the processes, behaviors, structures,
rewards, etc., in his organization of tomorrow.
It is the goals he sets which determine his approach
to the change strategy, as well as reveals the chosen set
of values underlying the desired change. As an example,
a manager may choose to do the "minimum to get by" in
affirmative action or take on a very positive, action
oriented stance. Both kinds of actions have impact on the
future state, but each one obviously different. Resources
are affected differently; there are differences in the
rewards mechanisms; the emphasis on changing attitudes and
beliefs will be different in both kind and degree. Thus,
if a manager is sincere about the goals he has set, he
must know what he wants the end, future state to look like.
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"For example, if one were to take a picture of the new
condition of the affirmative action situation, what would
be happening? What would the policies be? What would the
practices be? What kinds of training would be occurring?
What would be the mix of personnel at that point?" [Beckhard
and Harris, 1977]
.
For a change strategy to be effective, this kind of
detailed description of the desired future state is becoming
increasingly important. The rapid rate of change in our
society demands that management be able to manage the process
of change, as well as perform its other functions. When
developing change strategies Beckhard and Harris suggest
that management develop a detailed description
of what the organization will look like when
the desired condition is achieved. This des-
cription should specify the expected organiza-
tional structure, reward system, personnel
policies, authority and task-responsibility
distributions, managerial styles and roles,
performance review systems, and performance
outcomes. Ideally this 'wide-angle' view will
be a comprehensive description of the future
state. However, the key point is that a
detailed picture should be produced, be it a
'snapshot* or a 'movie.' Defining explicitly
what the organization would look like in the
new state serves as a descriptive guide for
determining the change strategy. When coupled
with an assessment of the present state, this
'picture* of the future condition provides the
information necessary for management to develop
realistic action plans and timetables for
managing the change. [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]
This detailed blueprint of the desired future state serves
as a homing beacon. The manager and his associates can
develop their action strategies around this keenly visualized
future state. One last consideration is that once the
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organization achieves the desired future, the manager needs
to take steps to maintain the change. People in the organi-
zation need to behave compatibly with the "future state."
Thus stability in the desired future state is also a goal
[Harris, 1978]
.
3 . Transition State
The transition state is an important "period of time
and state of affairs" to be managed. Once the desired future
state is clearly described, and the present state is well
understood and defined, the manager has to think carefully
about the time frame between the present and future states.
This time frame must be seen as a unique and distinct period
to be managed. The manager must be prepared to facilitate
the transition state while simultaneously manage the day to
day affairs of the organization.
As part of the transition state, the manager must develop
a change strategy which is compatible with the change effort.
The important issues proposed by Beckhard and Harris include:
1) Determining the degree of choice about whether to change
2) Determining what needs changing;
3) Determining where to intervene;
4) Choosing intervention technologies .
Part and parcel to transition state management is the fact
that it is often difficult for a stable organization to change
itself. Harris and Beckhard point out that the creation of
temporary systems are often necessary in order to accomplish
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the change. The regular structures of the organization have
difficulty in becoming the structures used to manage the
change. Therefore, a separate management and structure may
be needed to accommodate the transition period and its
processes
.
Two other key areas affecting the transition state
involve 1) developing a process or activity plan for the
change, and 2) developing a commitment plan to begin getting
the essential people committed to support the change process.
In the consideration of planned change it is apparent that
transition management and governance of the structure are
keys to success. However, the transition state is often
overlooked, often with serious consequences. Yet if managers
spend the time and effort to explore this valuable concept,
implementing planned change would be less difficult.
C. SUMMARY
In this chapter an organizational change model was dis-
cussed. The model springs from the applied science discipline
of organigation development which is concerned with improving
organizations through an approach aimed at successfully
managing the process of change. Organization development
relies on a total systems view of organizations and offers
new technologies and models for realizing organizational
goals in an increasingly complex environment.
The Beckhard and Harris model offers a technique or a
way of conceptualizing the managing of a major organizational
45

change process. The following chapter addresses equal
opportunity and affirmative action in the Coast Guard officer




IV. U.S. COAST GUARD (PRESENT STATE - FUTURE STATE)
One of the key steps in the Bekchard and Harris model was *
to carefully assess the "present state" and a desired "future
state" of an organization. In detailing the present and
future states for Coast Guard affirmative action for black
officers the following dimensions were used: Coast Guard
general policy on affirmative action, the organizational
climate, the recruitment of black officers, the selection
process, assignment and promotion policies, and civil rights
training.
In describing the present state, the intent was not to
be evaluative but rather it was to present a descriptive
picture of the current state of affairs regarding black
officers and affirmative action in the Coast Guard. Underlying
the discussion and description of a proposed future state,
selected in this instance as a period of time one to three
years hence , is the notion that the future can be better. In
fact, it needs to be better relative to affirmative action
goals if the Coast Guard is to manage the complex process of
social change without disruption and interference of its
missions. Social change is not something to be left unattended
or to chance. It is a process that requires effective manage-
ment and organization development can help guide the process





1 . General Policy
The concept of affirmative action has either a veiled
existence or is completely disavowed in the various written
equal opportunity policies in the Coast Guard. The Commandant,
Admiral John B. Hayes, in promulgating the new Civil Rights
Manual [COMDTINST M5350.11A] states that "the objectives of
the military civil rights program is to ensure full and
affirmative implementation of civil rights and equal opportunity
laws and precepts within the service." The Commandant also
stated that "this objective can only be achieved through the
elimination of discrimination based on race, color, sex,
national origin, and religion." Nowhere does the Commandant
state outright support for the use of affirmative action for
rectifying the problems caused by past and present discrimina-
tion. It should be recognized that "affirmative implementa-
tion" does not necessarily mean affirmative action, and from
the Commandant, the difference between a tacit approval of
affirmative action as opposed to an outright endorsement is
significant. The significance is quickly established by the
tone set in the Civil Rights Manual. As the definitive, broad
policy document on civil rights for the Coast Guard it essen-
tially represents an aggressive stance toward creating a cli-
mate of non-discrimination.
The Coast Guard is committed to a program of
aggressive action to achieve equality of
opportunity and treatment for all personnel.
Race religion, color, national origin, and sex
are not factors in determining the worth of an
individual in the service and therefore, shall
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not be factors in determining how an individual
is to be treated. [ Introduction to Coast Guard
Military Civil Rights Manual, COMDTINST M5350.11A]
But according to several recent authors (e.g., Albrecht
and Hall, 1979, Northrup, 1979) non-discrimination by itself
is not affirmative action. "To be truly affirmative, a company
must take specific steps to remedy the present effects of past
practices. What this may mean in practice is that a company
has to go out of its way to recruit, select, train, and promote
.. .minorities. . .until they are equitably represented in the
work force" [Albrecht and Hall, 1979].
In the Policy section of the Coast Guard Military Civil
Rights Manual the two precepts which provide the basis for
"full and affirmative implementation of civil rights and equal
opportunity laws" are listed as:
1) Personnel Treatment . The equal and just treatment of
all personnel is a well established principle of law as well
as effective personnel management. Such treatment is essen-
tial to attaining and maintaining an optimum state of morale,
discipline, and readiness.
2) Discriminatory Practices . Discriminatory practices
directed against military personnel and their dependents who
lack a civilian's freedom of choice in where to live, work,
travel, and spend off duty hours are not only illegal but
are harmful to unit effectiveness.
Neither of these precepts are concerned with recruiting or
upgrading minorities so they will be more proportionally or
equitably represented in all paygrades or occupational cate-
gories. Thus, it is apparent that affirmative action is not
one of the precepts used by the Coast Guard to support "full




Further evidence of non-commitment to affirmative
action is found in the Commandant's Long Range View, 1978.
The Commandant states that "to the extent possible, the Coast
Guard will take an active role in pursuit of satisfying national
needs, vice merely responding to existing conditions or waiting
to be specifically directed." Later, in the Long Range view,
he indicates that equal opportunity will continue to receive
special attention, but no mention of affirmative action is
evident, in spite of it being a federal requirement established
to meet a national need.
Continuing to elaborate on the Coast Guard's general
policy toward the use of affirmative action, we turn to Rear
Admiral V7illiam J. Stewart, the Chief of Personnel. In an
interview in July 1979 RADM Stewart indicated that the Coast
Guard has no obligation to make-up for what was done in the
past. He asserted that the Coast Guard is not involved in a
make-up game or a numbers game. However, the admiral made
clear that the Coast Guard is pursuing a vigorous policy de-
signed to identify it as an equal opportunity employer. The
Coast Guard is highly concerned about its image and is in
contact with the NAACP, NNOA, LULAC, et al . , for assistance
and advice. As for change in the officer corps, RADM Stewart
pointed out that the Coast Guard is involved in a series of
low key actions (e.g., BOOST, MITE, NAPS-descrbied in later
sections of this chapter) which emphasize minority enrollment
inthe officer corps [RADM Stewart, 1979].
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Another reflection of the prevailing view describing
the general policy of the Coast Guard vis a vis affirmative
action is found in a current District Military Affirmative
Action Plan (DMAAP)
. The following was extracted from the
Discussion section:
There is an opinion held by many people that
affirmative action plans are designed to give
preferential treatment to minorities and women.
The DMAAP was specifically designed to outline
methods to be used to gain equal treatment, not
preferential treatment, for all members of the
Coast Guard. [CCGD12 Instruction 5350 dated 12 Oct.
1978]
Decrying preferential treatment in favor of a theme of the
strict application of equal treatment in what is purported
to be an affirmative action plan indicates that the DMAAP is
a misnomer. Although called an affirmative action plan, its
intent is to eliminate bias and insure non-discrimination. It
does not aim to increase minority representation at all levels
in the Coast Guard. It is not a results oriented document.
In actuality it is an equal opportunity policy document in
tune with all other policy on civil rights in the Coast Guard.
It is fairly obvious that affirmative action is given
a very low profile in the Coast Guard. Its veiled existence
conveys a less than enthusiastic commitment to its principles.
Maintaining low key programs which have had negligible results
in bringing blacks into the mainstream of Coast Guard life
further demonstrates the low priority placed on affirmative
action principles. Given policies which disapprove of anything
but equal treatment, the Coast Guard is practically locked
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into a limited compliance strategy relative to the full and
affirmative intent of civil rights and equal opportunity laws,
a. Affirmative Action Requirements
In contrast to this general policy is the require-
ment for the Coast Guard to perform affirmative action,
especially given its present underutilization of black offi-
cers. The requirement is relatively clear and stems from a
variety of legislation, executive orders, and policy documents.
Principle among these are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as Amended, Executive Order 11246, Title 29 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, and the Department of Transporta-'
tion's Civil Rights Policy Document.
Former Secretary of Transportation,* Brock Adams,
in amplifying the federal directives and legislation on equal
opportunity issued the following specific guidance to the
Department of Transportation in his Civil Rights Policy State-
ment [Appendix B] . It was issued on 31 March 1977. Three
sections in the brief one page statement support and require
the practice of affirmative action.
1) There shall be vigorous affirmative action to assure
full, fair, and representative participation of minorities
and women.
2) Equal employment must become a reality in this department,
expressed by substantial increases in the number of minorities
and women at all grade levels in the DOT work force.
3) The implementation of this policy shall be top priority.
I shall insist that it be thoroughly understood, rigorously
followed and recognized as an integral part of every program
of this department. (Underlining done for author's emphasis)
Thus the Coast Guard, like all other federal agencies, is
required to implement affirmative action in order to bring
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fair representation of minorities in all ranks and levels of
employment.
2 . Organizational Climate
Assessing the organizational climate in the Coast
Guard relative to the officer corps and affirmative action,
requires drawing on findings internal and external to the
organization. The external factors are general findings
and are discussed because, in all probability, they reflect
the Coast Guard climate internally, to some degree. In general
the Coast Guard inherits the beliefs, attitudes, and values
associated with equal opportunity and affirmative action from
society at large. The yearly turnover of officers, some
retiring, others resigning, and new ones arriving reflects the
open system qualities of the organization. The boundaries of




Reflecting the organizational environment on
affirmative action and equal opportunity have been two compre-
hensive studies conducted in the past seven years. A 1972-1973
study by the National Urban League found widespread racial bias
in the Coast Guard [ New York Times , 3 May 1974] . Upon comple-
tion of the study, Admiral Bender, the Coast Guard Commandant
then, stated that special efforts were being made to increase
minority representation in the Coast Guard officer ranks but
were unsuccessful. He acknowledged that this generated dis-
satisfaction among minority personnel, and was cause for concern
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and action. The admiral also indicated that "too few Coast
Guard personnel have accurate perceptions of processes and
policies related to equal opportunity and civil rights [National
Urban League Study on Human Relation in the Coast Guard, 1972-
1973] .
In 1977 the Advanced Research Resources Organiza-
tion conducted "An Investigation of Civil Rights Problems in
the Coast Guard." Some of the findings that emerged relating
to the officer corps were as follows:
1) Whites feel more than blacks that there is an acceptance
of minority lifestyle differences in the Coast Guard.
2) Blacks encourage minority leadership more than do whites.
3) There is more supervisory discrimination experienced
among blacks than among whites.
4) Blacks tend to feel more than whites that command com-
munication with minorities is not very good.
5) Whites tend more to feel that minorities are getting
more than their share of equal opportunity.
6) Whites are more positive in their assessment of command
anti-discrimination activism in the Coast Guard than are
blacks
.
7) There is more interpersonal discrimination experienced
among blacks than among whites. [Romanczuk and Glickman, 1977]
In addition, Romanczuk and Glickman stated that often inci-
dences of discrimination go unreported. But apparently things
are changing and more and more of these incidences are now
being reported.
According to Captain Walden, Deputy Chief of the
Office of Civil Rights, the number of discrimination complaints
in the Coast Guard is on the increase. But he explained that
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the increase is most likely due to increased awareness of
grievance procedures and a willingness to use them [Capt.
Walden, 1979]
.
More generally, discrimination in the military
has recently been called a widespread problem. In an Air
Force Times interview the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Equal Opportunity, Kathleen Carpenter, stated that dis-
crimination in military promotion, grading, and assignment
policies still exist. It exists because past discriminatory
practices and injustices have not been compensated for and
therefore continue the effects of earlier discrimination prac-
tices (institutional discrimination). She also charged that
too many military officials believe enough has been done to
end discrimination. Their present attitude is apparently one
where if they don't have an overt problem, they feel they don't
have a problem [Carpenter, 1978]
.
In a study on affirmative action policy, Captain
John Condon, USA, attempted to measure the degree of perceived
affirmative action threat, i.e., the level of threatening feelings
associated with affirmative action policies, held by white
officer students attending the Command and General College.
His hypothesis was that significant threat feelings were per-
ceived but were separate from general racial feelings. Con-
trary to his hypothesis his study demonstrated that a high
degree of affirmative action threat feeling was positively
correlated with negative racial attitudes. In short his
conclusion was that a person expressing a high feeling of
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affirmative action threat is likely to express very intoler-
ant general racial views [Condon, 1975]
.
Also in this vein, Johnson found that "it is likely
that institutional arrangements and/or structure such as
affirmative action programs may be sufficiently associated with
blacks as to activate a concept of race and thereby illicit
prejudicial attitudes and behaviors" [Johnson, 1976]. Addi-
tionally, adding to the emotional aspects of affirmative
action are what have now become highly charged and ambiguous
words such as "quota," "reverse discrimination," and "qualified."
b. The General Mood
No doubt the changing mood in America toward black
opportunities over the past decade has affected men and women
in the Coast Guard. A Harris Poll in 1970 showed that 76 per-
cent of whites believed that blacks experienced discrimination
in their effort to achieve equality. But just seven years
later, another Harris Poll showed a sharp decline in this atti-
tude. Only one third of whites believed that blacks were
being discriminated against, and even fewer thought discrimina-
tion existed in housing, education, and unemployment. In
fact, the majority of Americans (55%) felt that blacks were
pushing too fast for equality. "If blacks were at the bottom,
most of them (Americans) believed it was because of their
own shortcomings" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]
.
The statistics did not support the changing atti-
tudes. For example, the median income for blacks in 1977
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was 59% of white income, one percent higher than in 1966.
Between 19 67 and 1977 black unemployment doubled. Although
some blacks made significant gains, there were more than off-
setting losses. Studies in the labor market showed that
blacks made their greatest gains in the last decade in areas
where there was not much competition from whites. "The nega-
tive statistics were all higher than they had been during the
era of urban violence" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]
.
Edward Hall, the noted anthropologist, describes,
in his book Beyond Culture (1976) , his perception of a mounting
frustration in the black community due to black talents and
abilities going largely unrecognized and thwarted by a white
majority. Their sense of powerlessness to make the system work,
and even deeper, the black's self perception of being powerless
can only have grave consequences unless altered [Hall, 1976].
c. Institutional Racism
Black managers, executives, administrators, etc.,
are often subjected to a variety of pressures, stress, and
influences which do not affect their white counterparts. The
resulting effects have often acted as hurdles for black upward
mobility. Although individual racism, defined as overt acts
of discrimination or violence, is no longer an accepted norm
in the United States, institutional racism, which is far more
subtle, runs rampant. According to Chesler:
American society now operates in a fashion that
feeds upon historic injustice done to minority
groups so as reinforce and maintain their lower
status and lesser rewards. It is argued that this
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is so embracing an operating principle that it
no longer requires conscious or overtly racist
acts to sustain it. Thus, racism is explained
in terms of the normal operations of our insti-
tutions that are laid on top of patterns of
historic injustice/racism. [Chesler, 1976]
Institutional racism operates in a variety of ways
to limit blacks' upward mobility. The organizational climates
of most modern companies have produced a lack of "fit" for
the black to the company culture, i.e., the norms, expected
behaviors, attitudes, values, etc. Most management blacks
do not have access to the informal organization as do most
whites. The social and political networks are not as open to
him as they are to whites. Some persistent conflicts which
operate to maintain a lack of fit between whites and blacks in
the organization are: ethnocentrism (self-assured superiority
of one's own perspective, values, and actions); the misplace-
ment of one's own problem onto others as if they arose from
the other group's inadequacies; denial of access to desired
resources of opportunities; and disproportionate distribution
of power [Fromkin and Sherwood, 1976]
.
d. Black Officer's Role and Expectation
In looking at the black officer's role and expec-
tations in the Coast Guard we find that some of these conflicts
operate to add certain pressures on the black officer. Some
of these pressures were recently discussed by a retired Coast
Guard officer, LCDR Max Berry. Over the years LCDR Berry has
had the opportunity to counsel many black officers. According
to LCDR Berry the typical young black Coast Guard officer
(ensign, LTJG, and lieutenant) feels that he has to achieve a
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level of performance above and beyond one that the average
white needs to perform to get promoted. The black officer
"feels" a more critical eye in being supervised by senior white
officers and therefore feels he has to prove himself constantly.
Because of their conditioning, blacks feel that they must
always be "on watch." They are often wondering when the pro-
verbial axe will fall. They simply expect it to happen. The
black officer wants to be and act like everyone else but feels
that if he slips up, he will get punished, whereas the young
white officer can afford to make mistakes. Each time an adverse
issue develops, the black officer believes that it will auto-
matically be reflected in his fitness report. In a sense, the
black officer suffers from a "crisis paranoia." His perception
is such that he thinks he will not get a second chance. There-
fore, the young black officer sometimes, in trying to prove
himself, remains aloof from other officers in the wardroom.
But he also feels the pressure to "join the wardroom. " No
doubt, the young black officer has a difficult role, perhaps
more difficult than the average young white officer's role,
but this is not often recognized or examined [LCDR Berry, 1979] .
3 . Recruiting
a. Background
To place the present state recruiting scene into
better perspective, a little bit of history is in order. In
1968 ten officer billets were added for minority recruiting
duty in recognition of the Coast Guard's inability to attract
minorities. Since then their potential for recruiting
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minorities has been watered down by the addition of a variety
of other responsibilities, unrelated to minority recruiting.
In December 1973 a recruiting division at Coast Guard head-
quarters and recruiting branches in each district were estab-
lished. That same year the commandant of the Coast Guard
established an 18% minority recruiting goal for both the
officer and enlisted corps. This figure reflected the minority
population of the nation. The commandant allowed for a three
year buildup to achieve this goal. In 1975 the commandant,
as a result of slow progress in minority recruiting, convened
an ad hoc committee to try and stimulate better ways of creating
minority representation. In 1976 the Minority Recruiting
Plan (CG 477) was introduced. Subsequent to this, minority
recruiting, except in the officer corps, began to show improve-
ment. Officer recruitment, in fact, through FY 1979 remained
far behind the established goals. The chief of the recruiting
division in headquarters, Captain Depperman, recently high-
lighted the current state of affairs in minority officer
recruiting by stating that "progress toward a racially balanced
officer corps is agonizingly slow" [Depperman, 1979]
.
b. Advertising
Nevertheless, today the Coast Guard is very active
in recruiting for black officers. This intense recruiting
effort is primarily directed at both black high school students
and black college students to encourage applications to the
Coast Guard Academy and Officer Candidate School, respectively.
The Coast Guard currently has recruiters in the field who are
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assigned to recruit solely for minorities. Assisting their
effort is a fairly comprehensive advertising campaign designed
to increase minority awareness of the Coast Guard Academy and
the Coast Guard in general. This includes spending an average
of $150,000 a year advertising in such minority magazines as
EBONY, JET, BLACK ENTERPRISE, DAWN, and NUESTRO. The Coast
Guard also purchases advertising spots on minority radio sta-
tions and last February (79) aired a 60 second T.V. advertise-
ment during "Roots: The Next Generation." Another set of
advertisements appear in college placement publications at
selected institutions with high minority enrollment. The
listing of these advertisements are often timed to appear just
before the arrival of a Coast Guard recruiter on campus.
Extensive use of black Coast Guard personnel appearing in
recruiting posters, brochures, magazines advertisements, and
television advertisements is standard practice, although
advertising in general is racially balanced,
c. Goals and Milestones
The future goals and milestones for the minority
recruiting effort are listed below. They are not broken down
by race or ethnic group; the figures simply represent a mini-
mum desired minority population in the Coast Guard with an
ultimate goal of 18 percent reflecting the current minority




Fiscal Year: 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
Officer Minority
commissioning rate: 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
The desired admission rate for minority Coast Guard Academy
cadets is equivalent to the officer minority commissioning
goals [Coast Guard Minority Military Recruiting Plan]
.
These goals and timetables clearly reflect the
intent of present legislation. The Coast Guard, in estab-
lishing goals and milestones affecting the officer corps could
have selected numerical objectives which reflected the
availability of sufficient qualified applicants. Thus, the
percentages could have been far lower than present target per-
centages since the minority representation in available labor
market pools (e.g., blacks among managers, blacks with bachelors
degrees, blacks in the upper 10% of their high school class)
is less than the black percentage in the population [HUMMRO-Tech
Report; Bates, 1973]. However, the interim goals or targets
for previously excluded groups is permitted to exceed their
current representation in the available labor force so that
long term goals may be reached in a reasonable period of time
[Title 29 CFR] . Besides, the available qualified pool for
selection to the officer corps is one that has been artificially
restricted as a result of what Congress has called the "complex
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and pervasive" nature of systemic discrimination against
minorities. As a result, Congress as well as the courts have
encouraged voluntary affirmative action which may consider
race, sex, and/or National origin in making selections from
among qualified or qualifiable applicants in order to achieve
established goals [Interpretive Guidelines January 19, 1979
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION APPROPRIATE UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED],
d. Organization
The recruiting organization in the Coast Guard is
led by a Captain who runs the recruiting division in Coast
Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The division includes a
staff of approximately eight officers. One of these officers
is designated the minority program administrator. Another offi-
cer fills a billet which is responsible for overseeing minority
advertising. The remaining officers, although not assigned
directly to minority recruiting, assist the minority recruiting
effort in a variety of ways due to the emphasis and priority
that minority recruiting has received. Briefly stated, the
recruiting division in headquarters places heavy emphasis and
attention on minority recruiting.
In the field, each Coast Guard district in the
continental United States has an officer recruiter who recruits
solely for minority officers. Each of these recruiters is
responsible to the district recruiting branch chief. Thus,
there are two officers in each district specifically assigned
to recruiting duties. Essentially, they work under a simple
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matrix system. The recruiting branch is responsible to the
Captain in headquarters (G-PMR) for achieving their goals.
However, most of the officer recruiters are also assigned
collateral duties in the district unrelated to recruiting,
to training of some sort. Their performance evaluations are
written by the Chief of Personnel within their own district.
Simply put, in the districts the officer recruiters* primary
responsibilities are monitored by the staff side of the Coast
Guard organization while their performance evaluations are
written by the line side of the Coast Guard organization which
has no responsibility over recruiting goals. For example, the
line organization in the district, from the district commander
on down, is unaffected by success or failure in the effort to
recruit a black officer. This is different from private indus-
try practice. Typically, private industry places a recruiting
field staff under line control and can thereby hold the line
responsible for results [Northrup, 1974] . Incidentally, of
the ten officer recruiters who currently recruit for minorities
in the districts, two are black.
Apart from this organization in recruiting is a
separate recruiting effort which operates from the Coast Guard
Academy in New London, Connecticut. The thrust of this effort
is aimed specifically at increasing the number of qualified
minority applicants to the Coast Guard Academy. A Coast Guard
commander is chief of the recruiting division in the admissions
office and he has four officer recruiters assigned to him.
Each officer is assigned to recruit in one of four regions in
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the country. Their responsibility, with rare exception, is
to recruit for minorities. When they travel to their own
regions, they often coordinate their efforts with the local
district recruiting offices. Of the four recruiters one is
black [CDR Hickey, 1979].
e. Programs
Part and parcel to the minority recruiting effort
are several programs which assist in this endeavor. The
academy has a mail out program which contacts "qualified"
minorities and informs these potential candidates about the
academy. The academy also contacts various military and civilian
"sponsors" who are willing to follow up and provide additional
information to minority applicants to the academy [LT Hertz,
1979] .
A third program the academy is engaged in is called
"MITE" (Minority Introduction to Engineering) . Minority high
school students, mostly from the Northeast, are brought to
the academy for a week's visit. The orientation emphasizes
the engineering aspects of the academy's curriculum and involves
each of the students in an engineering project. Although many
of the "Mite" students apply to the academy, none has ever
qualified for admission due to low college board scores [LCDR
Smith, 1979].
Another program used by the Academy to try and
increase its minority participation is BOOST (Broadened oppor-
tunity for officer selection and training) . BOOST is a Navy
prep school in San Diego which provides a concentrated 15
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month curriculum in high school and freshman college subjects
in an environment similar to the academies. Students at
BOOST are young enlisted men and women who demonstrate poten-
tial for being accepted at a service academy [Shook, 1979].
At its inception in 1973 BOOST was an affirmative
action program but it since has been made available to all
applicants, majority and minority. The result was that last
year the Navy dropped down to a 14% enrollment. The Defense
Equal Opportunity establishment this year has required the
Navy to enroll a minimum of 60% minority. Whether the Coast
Guard will follow suit is unknown at this point. The Coast
Guard began using BOOST in 1977 having received ten billets
per year by special permission of the Chief of Naval Operations,
The Coast Guard has averaged about a 30% minority enrollment
each year. In the past three years six blacks have been sent
to BOOST by the Coast Guard. Of the six, one was selected
for appointment to the Coast Guard Academy but has since re-
signed. Senior Chief Shook, an administrator at BOOST, com-
plains that the Coast Guard Academy does not take into adequate
consideration the training the BOOST students receive. His
argument is that the BOOST students' original high school rank
is being used in the determination of the first cut scores and
knocking them out of contention before their BOOST record is
considered. He feels that the BOOST candidates should be given
some kind of special consideration in the admissions process
at the Coast Guard Academy. For example, the Naval Academy's
normal cutoff on the college boards is 520 verbal/600 math but
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the BOOST cutoff for serious consideration to the Naval
Academy is 450 verbal/500 math [Shook, 1979].
The most recent program the Coast Guard Academy
has become involved in to increase its minority participation
is the Naval Academy Prep School in Newport, Rhode Island.
The Navy has provided the Coast Guard with approximately 15
billets each year. The Coast Guard Academy intends to select
highly promising civilian minorities who barely missed appoint-
ments to the Academy for this additional year of specialized
training. Academy officials are especially keen on this pro-
gram and expect it to increase black participation in the
cadet corps [Capt. Randle , 1979].
In terms of the overall minority officer recruitig
effort, the recruiting division in headquarters sponsors an
annual seminar on minority officer recruiting. The purpose
of the seminar is to bring together those involved in minority
officer recruiting to exchange information on recruiting tech-
niques and to plan better recruiting strategies,
f. Environment
For the most part, explaining the poor results in
black representation in the officer ranks the prevailing view
both in headquarters and at the academy is that the pool of
qualified candidates for OCS and the academy is so limited,
and the competition for these qualified candidates is so intense,
that it provides an extremely difficult challenge to acquire
black officers in the Coast Guard. The competition for these
qualified blacks comes from both the civilian sector, where
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affirmative action is practiced in earnest along with attrac-
tive starting salaries, and from the other armed services which
enjoy better visibility and awareness from the public than
does the Coast Guard. Coupled with this is the fact that the
Youth Attitude Tracking Study, a document prepared for the
Department of Defense, indicates a declining interest in
America's youth to join the services [Depperman, 1979]. Any
propensity for blacks to lose interest in joining the services
would of course sharply exacerbate the already difficult black
officer recruiting problem. In particular, one problem the
Coast Guard faces is that it still has a poor reputation in
the minority community.
It is generally considered that the Coast Guard
is not well known in the minority community and,
where we are known, our image as an equal oppor-
tunity employer is less than favorable. We are
viewed by many as a white elitist organization,
no doubt, because over the years our ranks have
included so few minorities and none in high
level, visible, positions. Our low profile among
minorities is considered to be our biggest
obstacle. [Coast Guard Military Minority Recruiting
Plan]
g. Recruiters
And finally, in looking at the present state of
recruiting, we turn to the recruiters themselves. Eventually,
practically every recruiter for black officers gets frustrated.
There is pressure on them to find the "qualified" black. In
their own minds they often recruit black talent that they feel
is qualified and capable of performing successfully at the
Academy or OCS . However, all too often, these candidates are
rejected as they do not meet the high selection criteria.
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Any innovativeness the recruiters display is played down; they
often become tasked with other unrelated responsibilities;
and most frustrating, they find little success for their hard
work. Competing against private enterprise for the "qualified"
black also poses a difficult challenge. The Coast Guard black
officer recruiter does not have the power to give jobs, only
promises of what the future might bring. The private sector
recruiter can often promise the job. The Coast Guard recruiter
talks about a rigid and demanding selection process, inter-
views, time delays, etc. Private enterprise recruiters offer
the job now with a more attractive starting salary. After a
year or two working in this environment, where it is difficult
to find success, frustration is altogether common [LT Sapp,
1979]. "A lack of positive motivation and commitment among
recruiting personnel and other Coast Guard individuals and
their commands is viewed as a large factor to be overcome.
Collectively the Coast Guard has improved substantially in
this area in the recent past but many, particularly minorities,
believe there is significant room for improvement" [Coast Guard
Military Minority Recruiting Plan]
.
h. Outlook
Regarding the future, Captain Depperman feels that
achieving the Coast Guard's goals in minority recruiting is
linked to increasing the minority population awareness of the
Coast Guard and its opportunities. And in general "to improve
officer recruitment will require continued emphasis on proven
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management techniques and sustained dedication, innovation,
funding, and support at all levels" [Depperman, 1979].
Recently, as a result of poor progress in Coast
Guard minority and female officer recruiting, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) provided the funding for 25
additional billets to emphasize minority and female recruiting
These billets may consist of civilians or military personnel.
Semi-annual reports are required back to OMB indicating the
Coast Guard's progress in this area [Chief of Staff memo 7100
dtd 29 Nov. 1978]
.
Another effort to step up minority enrollment in
the officer corps has recently been undertaken. The Office
of Personnel is in the process of establishing a consulting
group to assist the academy in examining its admissions proce-
dures. The consulting group will be led by RADM Lythcott,
USPHS (ret.) and will be composed of members who have had past
experience in raising minority representation at academic
institutions [RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979].
4 . Selection
How does the Coast Guard select its officers into the
officer corps? Currently there are six primary sources of
entry for prospective Coast Guard officers. The majority
of officers enter the corps each year as a result of gradua-
tion from the Coast Guard Academy. The expected number in
each graduating class largely determines the number of offi-
cers that will enter through other sources. The desired break-
down for non academy accessions is as follows:
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10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100'
1. Maritime academy graduates (direct commissioning)
:
8%
2. Prior service aviators (direct commissioning)
:
10%
3. Direct commission lawyers:
4%
4. Active Duty enlisted:
16%





The total number of officers entering each year is basically
determined from a stochastic officer simulation model. Inputs
to the model include the numbers of expected vacancies that
will occur in each of the officer communities, Academy class
sizes, total number of authorized billets, et al. The output
of the model is the number of officers desired for the various
programs [Lanterman, 1979].
a. Coast Guard Academy
Appointments to the Coast Guard Academy are offered
to individuals who successfully compete in competitive examina-
tions and meet certain general requirements for eligibility.
Each applicant is required to take either the College Entrance




These tests account for 30% of the weighting factors. Another
30% is the high school rank. These two account for 60% of
the weighting, and are the fixed weighting factors in the
admissions process. In order for a candidate to be eligible
for further consideration in the admissions process he or she
must score a minimum of 3 000 points on the fixed factors. ACT
and high school rank are converted to a score on a 200-800
scale, similar to the CEEB. The first cut is determined by
multiplying the math score by two, the English score by one,
and the high school rank by three. Thus, the maximum score
is 4800 since the highest individual score is an 800 [LT
Hertz, 1979]
.
The remaining 40% of the admissions process for
those who make the first cut is determined by a cadet evalua-
tion board composed of volunteer officers who are assigned
at the Coast Guard Academy. Operating in teams of three, each
team member individually evaluates a candidates entire record,
including the results of the competitive examinations and
high school rank. Underlying this evaluation is the "whole
man" concept. The officers are given guidance in written
form to assist them in their evaluations. Essentially, their
evaluations should reflect their opinion of the candidates
future potential as a cadet and officer with special emphasis
on leadership qualities. These officers may be heavily
influenced by the fixed factors available to them in the
record. They may also be favorably influenced by strong
letters of recommendation, the earning of varsity letters in
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athletics, participation in extra-curricular activities,
steady employment, etc. Generally, the officers will score
the candidate favorably if the record indicates signs of
initiative, motivation, and leadership [LCDR Smith, 1979;
LT Hertz, 1979], unless the fixed factors appear too low.
Occasionally, the board will find a letter in a candidate's
file from either the Director of Admissions, athletic coaches,
or both. This is an additional source of influence which can
carry a lot of weight. In the case of the Director of Admissions,
it reflects a long process of recruiting, follow-up and analy-
sis of a minority candidate. Captain Getman, the director
of admissions, will weigh heavily the recruiter's opinion of
the attributes and qualities of the minority candidate. If
the minority candidate was part of Project MITE, Captain Getman
will have received additional information from members in the
engineering department about the capabilities of the candidate
as a result of their observations of the student doing his
engineering project. Informally, Captain Getman will have
acquired substantial information on minority applicants. Armed
with this additional information Captain Getman makes a deci-
sion about each marginal minority candidate as to whether he
will endorse this candidate with his own personal letter.
The influence of this letter can be substantial, especially
since the evaluation board is aware of the enormous effort and
difficulty involved in recruiting qualified minority candi-
dates for the Coast Guard Academy [LT Hertz, 1979].
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Once the evaluation process is complete and the
candidates have successfully met the other general require-
ments, they are all rank ordered and appointments are tendered
by order of merit. Meeting the other general requirements
include passing a comprehensive physical exam; passing a
physical aptitude exam; reflect certain moral character; be
unmarried; meet certain height and age criteria; and have
sufficient minimal credits in prescribed high school subjects.
There are no waivers of educational or physical requirements
[Title 33 CFR part 40]
.
The 3 000 point cutoff for the first cut was
established by the former Director of Admissions, Captain
Malcolm Williams. It reflected his view, based on studies
he performed, as to what a reasonable cutoff for predicted
successful performance at the Coast Guard Academy should be.
For the cadet classes of 1981 and 1982 this cutoff was raised
to 3200 points since applications had increased and the com-
petition was keener. It also meant looking at less numbers
of records. But since only two blacks were admitted to each
of these classes, the cutoff was lowered back to 3000 points
[LCDR Smith, LT Hertz, 1979]
.
b. Officer Candidate School
Civilians applying for Officer Candidate School
must have a college degree. Those interested in applying to
OCS must take the officer qualification test, OQT, a 90
minute exam. If they pass the OQT and meet certain other
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basic requirements, an interview and a physical exam are
arranged. At the interview an appraisal of each applicant's
potential as a commissioned officer is determined by a board
of three commissioned officers. Found physically qualified,
the candidate's interview results, his completed application,
and the OQT test results are forwarded to Commandant (G-PMR)
,
the recruiting division, for evaluation. Those found quali-
fied by Commandant (G-PMR) are then placed on a competitive
selection list. The placement on this list is derived from
a matrix using the OQT score on one axis and college grade
point and experience factors on the other axis. Using a
to 10 scale, the maximum score a candidate could achieve would
be 10,10.
Selection boards are convened twice yearly. The
board consists of three officers all from the recruiting
division and is chaired by the chief of officer recruiting.
The process for selection is not based on a strict merit sys-
tem. There are no hard and fast rules for selection; the board
is flexible in whom they may choose. The only external influ-
ence the board receives is an input from the office of offi-
cer personnel indicating how many officers with engineering
backgrounds are desired. Since the board is composed of offi-
cers from the recruiting division it is acutely aware of the
Commandant's intentions for minority representation, and the
board is aware of which candidates are minority candidates.
If the board feels that it has not selected enough minority
candidates it will generally reach below its own arbitrary
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cut-off in order to insure adequate minority representation
of those selected [Capt. Depperman , 1979]. The entire list,
including those not selected, is then forwarded to the
chief of the recruiting division who approves the final
selection list [LT Mitchell, 1979].
Incidentally, the OQT has been determined to be
culturally biased and the Coast Guard has recently adopted
the use of the OAR, a Navy developed exam which is considered
more fair [Fry, 1979].
c. Direct Commissioning
The officers who enter the Coast Guard by way of
direct commissioning are required to have a specialty back-
ground in which the Coast Guard is interested. These special-
ties are law, aviation (prior service) , and graduates of
maritime academies. Each applicant must submit to an inter-
view by a board of three Coast Guard officers, one of whom
is a lieutenant or above. Letters of recommendation are also
required and these letters accompany the basic application which
includes listing the college (s) attended and a transcript of
college grades. Direct commission applicants are not required
to take an entrance examination.
Each year selection boards convene, by specialty,
to review the records of the respective applicants. The board
is composed of six officers and is chaired by a Coast Guard
captain who possesses the same background specialty. At least
two other officers on the board must have the same specialty,





An officer from PMR (recruiting division) briefs
each board as to the numbers to be selected and insures the
board members understand the Commandant's intentions on
minority representation in the Coast Guard. The board is
also briefed by an officer from the officer personnel divi-
sion on the kinds of backgrounds desirable within the
speciality, e.g., admiralty law, fixed wing experience, etc.,
[LT Mitchell, 1979]. Those candidates selected report to
OCS for a brief indoctrination.
In general the pool of black candidates for direct
commissioning is extremely small. The numbers of blacks with
law degrees, prior service aviation experience, and maritime
academy degrees is so low that the Coast Guard cannot expect
to increase its black representation in the officer ranks
via direct commissioning in these specialties,
d. Prior Enlisted
All enlisted men in the Coast Guard desiring to
attend OCS must attain a minimum qualifying score on the OQT.
In addition they must (1) hold a college degree or (2) have
attained a qualifying score on the Dantes General Examination
of the College Level Examination Program or (3) have completed
one year of study at an accredited college and demonstrate
minimum proficiency in first year college level math.
Unless they have a college degree, enlisted men
applying to OCS must have four years of active service. They
also must meet certain general requirements, in some instances
more liberal than for civilians applying to OCS, and be
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interviewed by a board of three officers. Included in their
application for OCS must be an evaluation from their current
commanding officer regarding their potential value as a
commissioned officer [Coast Guard Personnel Manual, CG-207,
l-B-5]. The specific requirements for submitting the appli-
cation can be found in the CG Personnel Manual.
Historically, the Coast Guard has not been able
to send many black enlisted men through OCS. But unlike the
direct commissioning situation, the immediate future holds
more promise for increasing black participation in the offi-
cer ranks through the enlisted ranks since more blacks can
be found in the enlisted ranks than before.
e. Published Results
The statistical data readily available in the
Coast Guard on black officers is not sufficiently aggregated
in one location where someone can easily begin to evaluate
black officer progress. In many instances data on black
officers is not kept or not easily recoverable. One main
difficulty with acquiring statistical data on black officers
is the fact that certain statistics are kept for minorities
but not broken down for individual sub-groups. Appendix C
is a collection of statistics garnered from various Coast
Guard divisions. One statistical breakdown shows the number
of minority officer accessions by program sources. But, for
example, it fails to reveal the number of black officers
entering from each source. In checking with the Recruiting
Division, which published this commissioning status, it was
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found that this information was not compiled [LT Mitchell,
1979]
.
The number of blacks extending or integrating into
the Coast Guard was not readily available either. The inte-
gration and extension statistics in Appendix C was developed
by LCDR Juan T. Salas, USCG, for his own interest and then
published [LCDR Salas, 1979]. They do not include statistics
on blacks. Beginning with 1978 the recruiting statistics do
indicate the number of black entering cadets at the Coast
Guard Academy. The Coast Guard Academy does publish statis-
tics on the number of minority applications received, minority
appointments tendered, minorities sworn in each year, and
the number of minorities on board. This is shown in Appendix
C but it is not broken down into subgroups. (The note at
the bottom of that page was obtained by calling the academy
for those additional statistics.) Statistics on blacks being
assigned to command or to advanced training are not routinely
published.
In general it appears difficult for top management
to know exactly how black officers are faring in the Coast
Guard. This stems in part perhaps from a lack of resources
to perform the task of collecting and aggregating all the
statistical data necessary to evaluate black officer progress.
5. Assignment Policy
As of August 1979, the officer assignment branch in
the Coast Guard had no special written policy, affirmative
action guideline, or strategy regarding black officers.
However, certain pressures and demands existed as to how some
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black officers would ultimately be affected in their assign-
ments. These pressures and demands on the assignment offi-
cers sprung from three sources. The recruiting division in
headquarters was relying on having black officers to assist
in the black recruiting effort. Their philosophy was that
a black officer is needed in order to recruit a black, a
philosophy not altogether illogical. As a result of this
expressed need by recruiting, blacks have been assigned to
recruiting in disproportionate numbers over the years. Within
the past year the Office of Civil Rights (G-H) indicated to
officer personnel that what black officers require are "visi-
ble line" jobs, otherwise their upward mobility may be limited.
Consequently, the detailer who is in charge of administrative
assignments is caught in a minor conflict. The Civil Rights
Office wants black officers in visible line jobs, the Recruiting
Division feels it needs black officers to recruit blacks, and
adding to the squeeze is an internal policy to assign black
officers to the Coast Guard's large training commands. Inter-
est in having black officers assigned to training commands
stems from the apparent felt need to have black officers at
the various entry points in the Coast Guard, i.e., Cape May
Training Center, Alameda Training Center, Officer Candidate
School in Yorktown, Va. , and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in
New London, CT. There are also several billets where it is
"advisable" to have a black officer assigned (e.g., Office of




Considering the small numbers of black officers avail-
able for assignment and the lack of a specific affirmative
action strategy in assignments, the present demands for having
black officers assigned to a particular job are in some cases
driving the assignment decision, even though the assignment
officers want to give the individual officer's preference
card a high priority. Another influence in this process is
that, from time to time, minority officers are solicited for
certain assignments (e.g., recruiting duty) through the
Commandant's Bulletin .
Discussions with the other assignment officers who
detail officers to sea duty, certain types of shore duty,
and engineering billets revealed that they do not have to nor
do they take account of color in their assignment procedures.
Their principle guideline, especially for command, is "best
qualified" [LCDR Hamblin; LCDR Mercier; LCDR Karnis, 1979].
The lack of an affirmative action strategy in assign-
ments, in this author's opinion, recently came back to haunt
the Coast Guard. This past summer, two women were selected
for command of a WPB (an 82' or 95' patrol craft). No blacks
were selected. The women fully met the criteria for selection,
A young black officer who had asked for a WPB and was clearly
qualified for command was assigned instead to a staff position
where a "felt need" for a black officer in this assignment
existed. The one black officer relieved another black offi-
cer. Clarifying this assignment, there is a policy guidance
in existence for command selection to a WPB. Essentially it
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requires that selectees should be consistently strong per-
formers from the top forty percent of their year group. In
the rank ordering based on fitness reports and consistent
with a "best qualifier" policy, the black officer missed
getting selected for command by only a few places. The
detailer pointed out that there were many officers below the
black officer who were also qualified for command [LCDR
Hamblin, 1979]. The point here is that if affirmative action
had been a part of officer assignment policy, a young black
officer would have had a greater probability of being selected
for command. He might have received the visible line job
providing him with operational experience which is so valuable
to upward mobility. Notwithstanding this issue, the publicity
of having two women and one or more black officers assigned
to command would have been a real plum. Instead the Coast
Guard lost a real opportunity. The assignment of two women
to command and no blacks created disillusionment and discontent
within the black officer community. This latter impression




Promotion boards in the Coast Guard are required to
select officers on the basis of a "best qualified" promotion
system, without regard to race, color, religion, national
origin or sex.
Under a fully qualified selection, each officer
is compared against a standard, and all who
exceed the standard are recommended. In a best
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qualified system, the boards are limited to a
specific number they may select. Accordingly,
in addition to the fully qualified standard,
the board must also make selections based on
the comparison of each officer with all others
considered. This procedure permits the board
to select from the entire group the limited
number whom they feel are the best qualified.
[CG Personnel Manual (CG-207) , Sect. 14 A]
Each board is flexible to determine its own criteria
standard for selection but the basic criteria used is generally
the same, except that the degree of significance associated
with different factors may differ with respect to different
ranks and from board to board. The basic criteria is con-
sidered to be:
1) Performance of duties
2) Personal qualities
3) Education
Each board is briefed by an officer from the office of Personnel
on applicable laws, regulations, and the needs of the service.
Each member of a personnel board is required to evaluate impar-
tially and fairly the fitness of each officer whose name is
submitted to the board [CG Personnel Manual (CG 207, Sect. 14)].
A recent change to the promotion policy has affected
the composition of the promotion boards. The change requires
that each board be composed of representation from all groups.
This change was designed to reflect sensitivity on the part
of Coast Guard policy and in essence sends a signal which
represents concern over equal opportunity issues [RADM W.H.
Stewart, 1979] . Summary sheets of the promotion boards now
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Turning to performance appraisal in general we
find that studies [Senger, 1971; Beatty, 1976J show that
supervisors tend to evaluate performance of subordinates on
criteria separate from job performance. The criteria actually-
used is usually more socially related than task related and is
often dependent on the nature of the supervisor's beliefs,
attitudes, and values.
In the Open and Closed Mind Milton Rokeach pre-
sents a theory of prejudice as a function of similarity and
dissimilarity of beliefs held or perceived to be held between
people, instead of it being some deep rooted psychological
phenomenon. Rokeach states that:
Belief is more important than ethnic or racial
membership as a determinant of social dis-
crimination. Our theory leads us to propose
that what appears at first glance to be dis-
crimination among men on the basis of race
or ethnic group may turn out upon closer
analysis to be discrimination on the basis
of belief congruence over specific issues.
[Rokeach, 1960]
In general, Rokeach makes the point that the
person discriminated against is practically a "total stranger"
to the person doing the discriminating. White people have a
reluctance to inquire into the beliefs of blacks and therefore
do not know if their beliefs are congruent or not. As a
result, whites, especially the more closed-minded, assume
that the black possesses beliefs, attitudes, values, and
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personalities different from his own. The more this percep-
tion is believed to be true, the more he rejects the black
person, and the more likely he is to evaluate the black's
performance on the degree of difference in beliefs rather
than on objective performance criteria [Rokeach, I960].
Richard Beatty examined the problem of perform-
ance appraisal in a study which focused on a training program
for the development of black supervisors. His results indi-
cated that employers tended to evaluate minority performance
on factors unrelated to program content or task related be-
haviors. Instead performance was largely rated on other
behaviors black supervisors demonstrated while at work. More
specifically, they were rated to a great extent on their
social behaviors. Thus, Beatty concluded that it is essential
for a black supervisor to be aware of the impact that his/her
personal and interpersonal attributes may have upon an employer
[Beatty, 1976].
Consistent with Beatty * s findings is an article
written by John Senger suggesting that evaluations are composed
largely of the value orientations of the evaluator. And,
according to Senger, the higher one climbs in the organiza-
tion the more similar his values tend to be with those of the
present leadership. This exacerbates the promotional difficul-
ties for blacks since, as already alluded to by Rokeach, their
values are often perceived as different from those of whites,
whether they are or not. Senger further highlights the problem
with evaluations by describing the common perception of
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evaluations in modern organizations as being based on
objective and fair analysis. Thus, the dilemma for a black
person can be particularly complex. On the one hand he feels
frustrated and angry for not being promoted, while on the
other hand he is not sure why he was not selected [Senger,
1971] .
Shedding additional light for the appreciation of
the complex situation a black person can become placed into
is Abraham Zaleznik who wrote in The Human Dilemmas of Leader-
ship the following:
The anxiety experienced by the upwardly mobile
individual largely comes from internal conflicts
generated within his own personality. On the
one hand, there is the driving and pervasive
need to prove himself as assurance of his
adequacy as a person; on the other hand, the
standards for measuring his adequacy come from
sources somewhat unfamiliar to him. [Zaleznik, 1966]
This discussion on evaluation centers on a problem
that performance appraisal systems have had to cope with for
a long time. The need for relevant selection and performance
criteria is gaining added impetus but there still exists a
very large subjective component in evaluating subordinates.
Consequently, blacks may suffer more from this fact than do
whites because they often spring from a different culture and
may have different values than their usually white supervisors,
Supporting the thesis that blacks may be evaluated
differently than whites at the officer level was a statistical
analysis done by the Department of Defense.
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Finally, the impact of performance evaluations
on minority officers* eligibility rates, as
compared with those of nonminority officers,
has now been evaluated. H. Minton Francis,
deputy assistant secretary of defense, has
made public the results of a 1975 computer
analysis showing that black officers con-
sistently received performance marks five to
ten points lower than their white counterparts.
These evaluations, used as a basis for
periodic reductions in the services' officer
corps and a key factor in promotion, affect
retention. The present trend of lower per-
formance marks for minority officers has clear
and obvious implications for future minority
officer retention. It is extremely important
that racial bias not enter into these subjective
evaluations. The results of the above study
indicate that the need for continued effort
and, possibly, increased emphasis on the
services ' human relations programs are
needed. [Northrup, 1979]
The Coast Guard has not examined their officer performance
data to see if any significant differences exist between
white and black evaluations [RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979].
7 . Civil Rights Training
All Coast Guard military personnel are required to
receive the Coast Guard standardized civil rights training
program. This training consists of at least four separate
blocks of civil rights information and is designed to extend
and improve training heretofore received in the sixteen hour
(two day) standardized package. The current training is
8 hours (one day) in duration, but may be extended with
additional training blocks if the commanding officer so
desires. The training is to be conducted only by individuals
who have successfully completed training at the Defense Race
Relations Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.
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(DRRI conducts training for armed forces personnel and
civilian employees in the area of human/race relations and
equal opportunity. Within the past year DRRI ' s curriculum
has been revised and it now emphasizes organization develop-
ment theory and techniques in training their student
facilitators in equal opportunity.)
The eight hours of training begins with an "orienta-
tion" block which covers discrimination complaint procedures.
This block is mandatory. Optional training blocks which the
CO may choose from include "Basic Human Awareness," "Women
in the Coast Guard," "Military Rights and responsibilities,"
et al . Training is typically conducted in groups of between
20 and 25 people [COMDTINST 5354.4 dtd 11 April 1979].
Besides the formalized Coast Guard wide civil rights
training, individual commands develop their own human rela-
tions training programs. These programs are guided by unit
and district instructions, supported by the District Military




1 . General Policy
a. Affirmative Action
Unless Affirmative Action is taken to correct
past discriminatory action and their effects and
eliminate present procedures which limit full
participation by members of minority groups major
manpower concerns will develop with respect to
participation by minorities. [Edward Scarborough,
Defense Manpower Commission Staff, 1976]
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The Coast Guard needs a realistic affirmative
action policy in the 1980' s which will provide for a sub-
stantive, results-producing program in the officer ranks.
The present and past equal opportunity and affirmative action
policies have not gone far enough. Unfortunately, they
yielded little change in the racial composition of the
officer corps. A tough, aggressive recruiting posture is
not enough. Policies of non-discrimination and "equal" treat-
ment alone have not and will not produce the necessary and
appropriate change required by the intent of the courts,
legislation, and executive orders with respect to affirma-
tive action.
Maintaining those policies over the recent years
had anticipatable consequences. The Coast Guard, in casting
its affirmative action program in such an unrealistic and
veiled existence, was bound not to succeed. Those policies
will continue to be insufficient unless a major change in
Coast Guard affirmative action policy occurs.
The Coast Guard must make necessary adjustments
to its affirmative action stance if it is to meet the demands
of the next decade.
What is certain is that some organizations will
correctly identify the requirements for change
which the future will impose. Others will not.
By identifying those requirements and by
initiating the first stages of an analysis
of their consequences for his or her corpora-
tion, a manager may help the organization to
be one of those companies which masters, and
is not mastered by, the 1980's. [Mills, 1979]
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Right now is a serious time for affirmative action. More
vocal groups, pro and con, are developing. Legal concerns
reflected in the Bakke and Weber Supreme Court cases over
quotas and goals, reverse discrimination, and questions of
fairness continue to surface. "The full benefits of affirma-
tive action may be a long time in coming" [Sargent, 1978].
Regarding the future, Warren Bennis has stated
that there are six major human problems which must be addressed
in the next twenty-five years: integration, distribution of
power, collaboration, adaptation, identity and revitalization.
"How organizations cope with and manage these tasks will
undoubtedly determine the viability of the enterprise" [Bennis,
1968] .
Top leadership in the Coast Guard must recognize
that it is time for a new and different approach in the strategy
used to increase black participation in the officer corps. Top
leadership must adopt strong affirmative action policies rela-
tive to the officer corps. It must acknowledge that "affirma-
tive action programs are a means for effecting social change
and that their designers intended precisely that. Then let
management acknowledge that all social change produces con-
ditions of stress, resistance, and counterpressures , which
we sum up in the odious word 'backlash' and that this is bound
to happen. Having said these things openly instead of
swaddling them in bland abstractions, management will say,
pointedly, that disagreements with the direction, form, or
pace of social change represented by an affirmative action
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program can not be an excuse for inaction in carrying out
the program" [Blodgett, 1972]
.
The Commandant must take a more active, positive,
and personal approach to bring affirmative action to force.
He must provide emotional support and it must be evident to
blacks in the organization. They need to know that it is
more than just a paper policy, business as usual. Affirmative
action in the officer corps must be made the top priority that
was indicated by the former Secretary of Transportation, Brock
Adams. To make affirmative action a top priority requires
daring and brave decisions in policy changes that go to the
very heart of racism.
Equal opportunity doesn't just happen, it comes
about because managers make it happen. [President
Ford, 8 March 1975]
As already indicated, pressures for equal oppor-
tunities continues to grow, but unless the Coast Guard makes
the proper personnel decisions today, it will not have the
right racial mix of people tomorrow in its higher level jobs.
If the Coast Guard thinks it is in the business of training
leaders of tomorrow, it must provide for the training of
black leadership. Captain Getman, director of admissions at
the Coast Guard Academy, said last year:
If we are ever going to have equal opportunity
in the Coast Guard we need to have minority
graduates of the academy in leadership positions.
[ N.Y. Times , July 30, 1978]
For this to happen, the Coast Guard has to develop
a strategy which incorporates more than just a recruitment
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goal. Affirmative action will not work if all that is done
is to bring blacks to the Academy or OCS. The critical
affirmative action strategy should address how you get increased
numbers of blacks to graduate from the academy and OCS. At
minimum a graduation goal is needed. For example, the dean
and commandant of cadets at the Coast Guard Academy should
both have objectives which stress and address affirmative
action. Having a graduation goal would undoubtedly cost more
(e.g., five year graduation plans, tutoring, interpersonal
skills training, etc.). But having black officers in the Coast
Guard in greater numbers would have both tangible and intangi-
ble value. For example the image of having increased numbers
of black officers in the Coast Guard would have a positive
effect on the entire equal opportunity climate,
b. Equal Treatment
In general it is very difficult to measure social
concerns. At its roots are individual's beliefs and attitudes.
Affirmative action programs are either viewed as providing
equal opportunity or as providing reverse discrimination,
depending on one's vantage point [Beusse, 1976J
.
From the very beginning some people understood
that at the core of affirmative action was a policy of prefer-
ential treatment, and that to be fair may not be equal. The
goal is equal opportunity and the rhetoric of "equal treatment"
opposes affirmative action which is a way to bring about equal
opportunity. Affirmative action is a matter of providing equal
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opportunity in the short run so groups of individuals are
competing equally in the long run.
The Coast Guard's current policy, as previously
cited, argues for a strict application of "equal" treatment.
Considering the complex definition of equality in terms of
opportunity, what is equal treatment? Is equal treatment
really equal? No matter how you slice it, the strict appli-
cation of equal standards, at this point in our history, to
all blacks and whites alike, would be a travesty of justice
of major proportion. Wilhelm advances the notion that equal
treatment is in fact discriminatory or facist. At first glance
this may sound ridiculous. Yet his position challenges con-
temporary white efforts to have the best of both worlds - a
superior position and the feeling that it has been meritori-
ously earned [Katz, 1976].
By enforcing uniform standards regardless of
race 'no' discrimination against a person's
race is involved. But the impression of fair- .
ness is achieved only by overlooking the fact
that Negroes are not just like whites at the
time of promotion. To be judged by criteria
applicable to all persons irrespective of color
when the Negro is extremely different can
only mean the Negro will receive unequal treat-
ment. To enforce equal standards to unequal
individuals is to perpetuate inequality in the
name of equality. [Wilhelm, 1971]
A tragic irony is unfolding before us. A signi-
ficant segment of white society is belligerent toward being
subjected to minority quotas or goals. How quickly forgotten
are the quotas to which blacks were subjected to for so long.
"White society successfully froze blacks out of universities;
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froze blacks out of American professions; and froze blacks
out of the mainstream of American economic and social life"
[Jordan, 1974]. Vernon Jordan passionately argues for prefer-
ential admissions for blacks until such time as black people
may be regarded as having achieved full access to the pro-
fessions of American society. But now, in the name of
"equality," blacks are all too often discovering that they
are expected to break out of the vicious cycle of social and
economic inequality on an "equal" basis.
Schuman (1969) reports a steady decrease in
white American's belief in the doctrine of
innate racial superiority vis a vis the doctrine
of individual free will and choice. This assumes
everyone can "make it" on their own if protes-
tant ethic values are used. Schuman ' s research
shows that this strongly held view interacts
with white's growing understandings of the
reality of racial injustice to create confused
and ambivalent value stances. Perhaps this
theory helps to explain other empirical findings
that report that many white Americans appear to
be pro-black but continue to advocate social
actions and policies that foster racism.
[Katz, 1976]
No doubt, affirmative action goals will be difficult to
implement if some whites are not to bear the historic injus-
tice of the past.
How long must blacks wait before they have full
access to the Coast Guard? According to the book Blacks in
the Industrials World: Issues for the Manager , optimistic
projections (judging from improvements at the end of the
1960s) for blacks to obtain their fair share of jobs as
officials and managers will take 55 years, and as professionals
will take 84 years [Blodgett, 1972].
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For some blacks affirmative action is not needed,
but for others it is. "How else do you overcome the amazing
racial imbalance at the professional level shown by statis-
tics? When rightly understood, preference is a dignified
word and a justifiable practice" [Blodgett, 1972]
.
It is now well understood, however, that our
society cannot be completely color-blind in
the short run if we are to have a color-blind
society in the long term. After centuries of
viewing through colored lenses eyes do not
quickly adjust when the lenses are removed.
Discrimination has a way of perpetuating itself,
albeit unintentionally, because the resulting
inequalities make new opportunities less
accessible. Preferential treatment is one
partial prescription to remedy our society's
most intransigent and deeply rooted inequalities.
[Todorich and Glickstein, 1977]
c. Systems Approach
Having stated that affirmative action should be a
strong partner with the equal opportunity program for Coast
Guard officers, a succeeding proposal for the future state is
that a comprehensive approach to equal opportunity and affirma-
tive action should be instituted. In response to this approach,
a Human Resource Management (HRM) System would provide the
Coast Guard with a more effective means of selecting and uti-
lizing its people. Captain Walden, the Deputy Chief, Office
of Civil Rights, has already proposed that the Coast Guard
study an "organizatinal development (OD) " program. Essentially,
the object of the OD program would be to tie together the
Coast Guard's various "human" programs in a unified systems




Relative to organizations' view of social respon-
sibilities, Jay Nisberg sees three general deficiencies:
1) The lack of appropriate priority or emphasis on the
management of human resources.
2) The lack of high quality programs covering selection,
appraisal, individual development, career planning and other
important factors in the management of people.
3) The lack of a set of overall objectives toward which
organizations should be moving and a systematic plan for
effecting change in the make-up of the organization. [Nisberg,
1975]
A unified systems approach to the most funda-
mental objective of managers - the acquisition
and development of people - is needed, not only
to meet social and legal obligations, but also
to assure the future of your organization.
[Nisberg, 1972]
In general, the Coast Guard would be wise to look
toward a total systems approach in the HRM area which includes
significant attention to equal opportunity and affirmative
action issues. Its present affirmative action strategy will
not produce change, it will largely maintain the status quo.
A total systems approach offers the hope of changing the
present pattern which has suppressed black participation in
the officer corps. The advantages of a systems approach have
already been emphasized by the Commandant in his policy guidance
of 30 March 1979.
2 . Organizational Climate
The future climate of the Coast Guard should reflect
a positive effort on the part of the Coast Guard to carefully
monitor affirmative action programs. The future climate
should also reflect a continuing effort in the Coast Guard
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to search for new and creative ways to eliminate prejudice
and promote harmony among groups of people whose skin color
happens to be different. How is this to be done?
Warren Bennis stated that organization development
rests on three basic premises. The first is based on the
evolutionary principle that every age develops an organiza-
tional form appropriate to its genius, and that the process
of change requires us to revitalize and rebuild our organi-
zations. The second premise is that "the only real way to
change organizations lies in changing the climate of the
organization - the 'way of life,' a system of beliefs and
values, an accepted form of interaction and relating." The
third premise is that "a new social awareness is required by
people in the organization" [Huse, 1975].
This calls for changes in the Coast Guard climate if
affirmative action goals are to succeed. A number of varia-
bles impacting on affirmative action and equal opportunity
need to be addressed. These included, but are by no means
limited to, feelings, job satisfaction and characteristics,
expectations, organizational barriers, commitments, beliefs,
attitudes, and values.
a. Resistance
Changes in the climate of organizations, however,
do not come about easily. Internally few forces are driving
to change the system but many forces work against change.
As Chris Argyris points out, "many individuals are so 'syste-
matically blind* to their own behavior that they are 'culturally
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programmed' to behave in ways that considerably reduce the
probability of change" [Argyris, 1971]. Nevertheless, to
continue to operate effectively organizations must adjust to
rapid change. The Coast Guard's Civil Rights Program Outlook
(1982-1986) encourages the Coast Guard to be responsive to
the sociological needs of the society at large.
The present trend in sociological changes
indicates a need to provide responsive leader-
ship which relates to attitudinal changes of
the population from which we employ. ... it is
the area of sociological change which requires
the Coast Guard to become more people-oriented
and develop an increased sensitivity to
social and humanitarian issues. [Coast Guard
Office of Civil Rights' Program Plan Summary,
1979]
The future state demands that leadership in the Coast Guard
be sensitive to the needs of blacks.
In general, there is a need to reemphasize race
relations since there is mounting evidence that support for
equal opportunity is on the decline. Interviews with minori-
ties in the services indicates that they feel their services
are backing off from their usual front running position in
equal opportunity and race relations [Scarborough, 1976]
.
In particular, the Coast Guard must continue to research its
own climate and determine what programs are necessary to
insure viable and effective equal opportunity and affirmative
action stances which reflect fairness and equity for all
groups and individuals.
Concommitant with a decision to proactively adopt
and support affirmative action, the Coast Guard must take steps
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to insure that its officer corps is attitudinally prepared to
accept greater numbers of black officers in the Coast Guard.
b. Objectives
One recognized approach for affecting attitudes
is through training. Training (to be discussed in further
detail later) must emphasize new attitudes and foster the
appropriate links and bridges between whites and black which
are vital to black upward mobility and development of their
full potential. To begin, the Coast Guard needs to provide
a climate where the black officer, upon entry to the Coast
Guard, can expect the same treatment and upward mobility as
any other officer. They should believe that if they apply
themselves fully they will advance to the 0-6 levels and
above. Whites already have this expectation.
The Coast Guard has an obligation to even out the
odds for blacks who have executive potential. From his own
experience as a black executive in a large corporation,
Edward Jones drew up the following as steps an organization
could take to help combat the ineffectiveness of current equal
opportunity efforts:
1) Unquestionable top management involvement and commitment.
The top executives must have well thought out strategies,
not lip service.
2) Direct two-way communications between top management and
black trainees must be instituted to help counsel the poten-
tially crippling paranoia away which blacks may feel on
occasion from an insensitive white culture.
3) Appraisal of managers on their contribution to the com-
pany's equal opportunity objectives. Companies should use
the appraisal system to make the welfare of the black trainee
coincident with the well-being of his superior. Such action
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will probably receive heavy resistance from middle managers
and lower level managers. But managers are appraised on
their abilities to reach important objectives; and more
significantly, the inclusion of this area in appraisals sig-
nals to everyone involved that a company is serious! Failure
to take this step signals business as usual and adds to any
credibility gap between the company and black employees.
Tying managers equal opportunity contributions to the appraisal
system also motivates the trainee's superior to "school" him
on the realities of the political process in the organization.
4) Avoid the temptation to create special showcase-black
jobs. Line jobs provide experience and reality testing which
develop confidence required in positions of greater responsi-
bility.
5) Select assignments for the new black manager which are
challenging, yet do not in themselves increase his chance of
failure. [Jones, 1976]
Once the Coast Guard begins to increase its number of black
officers, the achievement of these and similar objectives is
the kind of organizational support critical to blacks to
help them reach their potential.
To assist in determining which particular objec-
tives need to be addressed and to help guide the future policy
and decisions in equal opportunity and affirmative action,
an ad hoc committee could be appointed. The committee would
operate similar in nature to the Professional Military and
Training Advisory Committee (PMTAC) which advises the Coast
Guard Academy on its cadet military and professional training.
The added support of a committee, sensitive to affirmative
action goals, could provide further insight on developing a
Coast Guard strategy surrounding equal opportunity and affirma-
tive action issues to those officers and civilians already
involved in equal opportunity. A commitment along these lines
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is also a signal indicating the Coast Guard is serious about
affirmative action.
Equal opportunity for black officers in the Coast
Guard will not be achieved until top leadership recognizes the
organizational, interpersonal, and intrapersonal barriers to
change that exist in the Coast Guard. Identifying these
barriers is as important as the black officer recruitment
effort. This will require a particular effort aimed at diag-
nosing the present selection practices and work environment.
Some of the areas that should be examined to determine if
real or potential barriers to black officer upward mobility
exist include:
1) Performance appraisal system
2) Career tracks and lines of progression
3) job requirements
4) supervisory attitudes and/or biases
5) employee resistance
6) peer and work group barriers
7) social barriers
8) psychological barriers [ALbrecht and Hall, 1979]
Also relative to organizational climate, Neely
and Luthans describe a "third phase" of affirmative action/
equal employment opportunity (AA/EEO) that is necessary to
achieve if an organization is to reach an effective, long
lasting approach to AA/EEO. In their view, the third phase
requires a planned change or organization development effort
that results in the following:
1) The organization changes its human, interpersonal
climate to one in which the unique contributions of minori-
ties and women are sought and welcomed.
2) Management begins to share its decision-making power




3) The organization accepts and affirms pluralistic
values, styles, and standards, believing that it may
experience a desirable synergistic effect as a consequence.
4) The organization ensures an equitable distribution of
opportunities for advancement and growth, availability of
resources, and rewards for accomplishments.
5) The organization adopts policies, programs, and prac-
tices that are flexible enough to be responsive to the
needs of all, both inside and outside the organization.
Neely and Luthans argue that organizations must become more
sensitive to the needs and values of their third phase AA/EEO
objectives. They cite, as one of the most effective ways
to reach their objectives, the organization development
technique of survey feedback. Research has generally substan-
tiated that timely-goal related feedback can improve perform-




The U.S. Army has been using a management instru-
ment known as RAPS - Racial Attitude and Perception Survey -
to monitor the racial climate of their units. It has proved
efficient and useful and they now have introduced an abridgeed
version of the survey known as RAPS2. The important point is
that the Army is using a survey to gain feedback on their racial
climate and using this feedback to assist their commanders
in overcoming racial discrimination problems and organizational
barriers to minorities [O'mara, 1978].
In general, feedback data can be analyzed to iden-
tify barriers to goal attainment in affirmative action and
equal opportunity. It can also be used to develop new ideas
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toward goal attainment as well as determine where the system
needs encouragement and who needs to be rewarded [Luthans and
Neely, 1978]. Not only is a survey a good method for evalua-
ting the equal opportunity climate, it also can serve as a
valuable vehicle for increasing awareness of the affirmative
action and equal opportunity issues. In order to improve the
Coast Guard's performance in these areas with respect to offi-
cers, the Coast Guard needs to know more than the fact that
it is deficient in some areas. It needs to know why, and
survey feedback is one excellent way for increasing under-
standing and awareness.
d. Defensible Plan
In terms of the legal climate, the Coast Guard must
have an effective, well developed and implemented affirmative
action plan. Having a strong and defendable affirmative action
plan is a good defense against litigation in the future. To
support such a plan, top leadership must begin to build in
the Coast Guard's budget an ever-growing commitment to the
equality of opportunities and to the expansion of those oppor-
tunities within the Coast Guard. Special training programs,
ROTC programs, etc., would surely add to the budget and be
a cause for concern. But top leadership must reflect on the
positive side which considers an enhanced public image, better
community relations, higher black retention, and an overall





But in the effort to "energize" the Coast Guard
toward the full use and implementation of an affirmative
action philosophy, there may be some inherent issues over-
looked. One of these is the effect that affirmative action
may have on the person who is hired as a result of affirma-
tive action. Once a black feels that he or she has been
hired only to fulfill government legal requirements, that
person may begin to feel frustrated and angry. Every employee
wants to feel valued by the organization for his or her own
unique abilities. If this feeling is absent their spirit
and motivation becomes reduced, the job becomes meaningless
and they ultimately lose their own self-respect [Clark and
Perlman, 1977] . But if a person knows he deserves his job
because of merit, ability, and potential for success, that
person will have the self-respect needed to perform well.
The argument of reverse discrimination can be very counter-
productive and deceptive in making people believe that only
the "best qualified" are hired. One way of handling this
problem is to emphasize to persons receiving preferential
treatment that they would have been best qualified if they
and their forefathers had not been victims of discrimination
and injustice. Then, those blacks selected preferentially
for admission to the Coast Guard officer corps can have
"the appropriate and secure feeling that, whatever detractors




However, the burden to implement affirmative
action is not entirely on the organization and its leader-
ship. The black has an obligation too in the future state.
He or she must be willing to exercise understanding and
patience toward the organization and the efforts it is
making. The black must assume that the organization is
acting in good faith, unless proved otherwise, and show a
lenient attitude toward it.
The individual must also acknowledge that
the whole organization process is a process
of building - building new attitudes, building
new career paths and opportunities, and
building a future of mutual trust and respect -
and that building something of true strength
and real equity takes a very long time.
[Clark & Perlman, 1977]
LT John Williams, USCG, said it well when he
advised black officers to "get out there, develop the power
of excellence, and use it to climb to the top. Develop
short and long range goals. Become aware of the many
educational programs available to increase your chances of
success, both in the Coast Guard and out. Read the profes-
sional publications and become aware of trends within the
Coast Guard, then request those assignments that are career
enhancing" [LT Williams, 1979]. LT Williams has hit upon
the implication for black responsibility once given the
opportunity to develop themselves. The Coast Guard has to
provide the opportunity. This much is owed blacks.
3 . Recruiting
The task for future state officer recruiting is to
somehow make the Coast Guard relatively more attractive to
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blacks than it has appeared in the past. Present state
recruiting revealed a vigorous recruiting effort but in
examining its background, philosophy, and organization
several new directions should be considered. However, it
would be a poor assumption to think that the total solution
to increasing black participation in the officer ranks can
result from a revision in the recruiting strategy alone.
Future state recruiting is certainly an important part of
the whole systems approach in implementing affirmative
action and needs to be pursued as forcefully as it is today.
Affirmative action is not license to select unqualified
candidates. The challenge to recruit highly capable
black officer candidates to apply to the Coast Guard officer
programs is still an instrumental part of affirmative action,
a. Pool of Candidates
Presently, the pool of potential black candi-
dates is large and increasing. By 1980 it is expected to
be 1.44 million blacks between the age of 17 and 21. This
represents a 32% increase over 1970 [Hester, 1977] . But
this has not made the Coast Guard's job any easier since the
competition for the qualified black high school and college
student is keener than ever before and demands an active
recruiting policy.
Nevertheless, in future state recruiting the
Coast Guard must begin to examine some of its own assump-
tions about the size and quality of the pool of potential
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black candidates. For example, in 1971 there was a study
produced by Fred Crossland which asserted that minorities
scored about 1 deviation below the mean of the rest of the
population on academic aptitude and achievement tests.
This led to the conclusion by some that there were only
about 1,200 black high school seniors who met the prima
facie requirements for admission to the service academies.
But Arthur Hester pointed out that there was little sub-
stantive evidence to support this figure. A temporary
special admissions committee at West Point (1968-1976)
determined that there were sufficient numbers of black
students who were both capable and desirous of attending
West Point. The first year it operated (1968) there was
a five-fold increase in the number of black cadets at West
Point and the following years saw a relatively stable number
of blacks enter West Point. The special admissions committee
was so successful that its function was institutionalized in
1972. It was disbanded in 1976 after having vastly increased
the number of black cadets at West Point. One principal
assumption it operated under was that the reported size and
quality of the black pool was in error [Hester, 1977]
.
In 1979 only 1,827 black high school students
were identified as eligible for admission to the Coast Guard
Academy [Cheatham, 1979]. Limiting the Coast Guard's
horizons to thinking that only 1,827 black high school
students in America were academically eligible for the Coast
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Guard Academy is counter-productive and almost ludicrous.
"Academically eligible" is an absolutely fuzzy term. There
may only have been 1,827 black high school seniors who
satisfied some combination of test scores (it speaks nothing
of high school rank, initiative, motivation, etc.) but
there are thousands upon thousands of black students who
are academically capable for admission to the Coast Guard
Academy. For example, when the Coast Guard Academy rejects
a black to the class of 1982 when his college board scores
are 530 verbal, 620 math it is not rejecting "academically
ineligible" blacks. It is rejecting an academically eligible
black who, in this particular year, was not high enough on
the rank ordered list of those selected.
What incentive does a recruiter have to recruit
a black who has college board scores in the middle 500s and
who may be highly capable and possess the other qualities
(e.g. leadership) that the Coast Guard looks for when he or
she realizes these scores do not normally make the cut?
The recruiter is perhaps prone to thinking that this student
is "academically ineligible." Future state recruiting calls
for an examination of the Coast Guard's assumptions about
the size and the quality of the pool of black candidates.
Recruiters should be enthusiastic about recruiting those
1,827 superstars but they should feel equally enthusiastic
about recruiting the thousands of other talented black high
school students whose academic test scores reflect the
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capability of meeting the academic requirements at the
academy. Affirmative action would provide added incentive
to the recruiting community since they would begin to see
success for their efforts.
b. Personalized Approach
Another direction the Coast Guard should take in
its recruiting strategy is to attempt to personalize its
approach. More key people should be personally involved.
According to Dr. Cheatham, a professor at the Coast Guard
Academy who has researched the college recruiting climate,
Georgia Tech. University enjoyed great success in its effort
to recruit top flight black high school students. It was
successful largely because the dean of admissions, the deans
of the different schools, engineering, etc., and specifically
assigned admissions counselors made special and personal
contact with those students.
Just as Captain Otto Graham might call a highly
sought after high school athlete, the Coast Guard's director
of admissions, the dean, and even the superintendent might
call or visit a potential black cadet and/or his parents.
The extra attention could have substantial impact in attracting
increased numbers of blacks to the Coast Guard Academy.
In regards to OCS, a district commander or one
of his senior ranking officers could occasionally become
similarly involved.
The idea of contact with the parents of the black
student should be seriously considered in almost all cases.
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The choice of college is influenced by several variables
(e.g., friends, parents, relatives, teachers, guidance coun-
selors, etc.). In a 1976 study on the Alabama freshman class
it was found that blacks are influenced by their parents as
to choice of college more so than any other factor. In con-
trast, whites were more influenced by their friends than their
parents [Hester, 1977]. Parents certainly can appreciate the
value of a service academy education. If personally contacted
by the recruiter and senior Coast Guard officials, they may
help the Coast Guard turn the corner on black recruiting. In
short, don't just recruit the students, recruit the parents
too! This strategy brings to mind "Lefty" Driesell, the
basketball coach at the University of Maryland who is famous
for his ability to recruit outstanding athletes. He has
stated that the key to his success was developing a relation-
ship primarily with the parents,
c. Training
Other future state considerations must include the
training of the recruiters, the reward incentives, and the
direction of their recruiting efforts. But even before the
training element is considered, particular emphasis needs to
be placed on selecting recruiters with personalities compati-
ble with the "selling" aspect of their job. They must show
special skill and aptitude for a recruiting assignment. To




In addition to present state training, which
includes "salesmanship" the non-black recruiters must be made
to feel comfortable when they recruit in largely black environ-
ments. This calls for special training in race relations
(see Future State Civil Rights Training) and particular empha-
sis on civil rights legislation and affirmative action require-
ments. They too must understand the management of affirmative
action. It seems plausible that a recruiter will spend time
where he or she feels comfortable and making a non-black
recruiter feel comfortable in a black environment may provide
additional recruiting payoffs. Interestingly, many private
companies insure that their recruiters are familiar with
civil rights laws and practices [Northrup, 1974]
.
One favored recruiting technique in private prac-
tice has been the "I Spy" (from the television show) concept
where two recruiters, a black and a white work together as a
team. They both should have sound knowledge of the organiza-
tion as well as the civil rights laws. And as serious recruiters
both should be familiar with current problems and current
thinking of blacks. This includes a familiarity with black
literature [Calvert, 1972].
d. The Billet
Certainly the billets for officer recruiting must
be made career enhancing, especially if the Coast Guard desires
to continue having an emphasis on maintaining black officers
as recruiters. The strategy of having a black officer repre-
senting the Coast Guard in a black community is still an
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important recruiting consideration. But the officer should
recruit in both black and other communities. Black officers
should not be depended upon to bring in all and only blacks
into the officer ranks. This would be hypocritical. However,
blacks should feel that they occupy billets which can provide
upward mobility. Perhaps this argues for making tours in
recruiting more than a one shot occurrence. The Coast Guard
could require repeat tours in recruiting and consider recruiting
part of a human resource specialty. The specialty gives
credibility and the repeat tours provide additional expertise
for improving future recruiting.
e. Additional Sources
The question comes up occasionally as to where
Coast Guard recruiters should be spending their time recruiting
for black officers. Is the Coast Guard fishing in the wrong
lake? Is it fishing in enough lakes? One senior Coast Guard
officer thinks that the Coast Guard should be concentrating
outside of urban centers and begin concentrating more in
middle class American neighborhoods. Another pocket worth
investigating is the junior college graduates.
Don't overlook the public community colleges
—
even though they may not normally be a major
recruiting source. The majority of all new
students entering public colleges today choose
a two-year college. Some feel that the com-
munity colleges may be the single most impor-
tant source of higher education for minority
group students. One source indicates that 'a
quarter of all black collegians are concentrated
in public two-year colleges in three cities,
New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In virtually
every large American city - Cleveland, St. Louis,
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San Francisco, Philadelphia, Miami, Dallas -
more blacks study at public community colleges
than at all nearby institutions combined.
[Calvert, 1972]
f. New Programs
Certainly paralleling the recruiting efforts for
the academy and OCS should be the serious consideration of
special programs. VADM Scarborough, the vice-commandant, and
Captain Waldon like a concept similar to the Marine leader-
ship school to bring blacks into the Coast Guard [Capt. Waldon,
1979]
.
ROTC type training established at minority institutions
has also been suggested [LT Sapp, 1979] . The Coast Guard could
establish a special tuition program for disadvantaged students.
It could pay for a student's college tuition for the four years
with the obligation to serve three years in the Coast Guard as
a commissioned officer. And finally direct commissioning once
again has been mentioned, both to bring in badly needed black
role models at more senior levels and to increase black junior
officer participation. Examining these many considerations
and recommending guidelines for each could be effectively
done by the ad hoc committee which was suggested earlier.
g. Time for Success
Regardless of what innovative strategy is devised
to attract more black applicants, it will prove self-defeating
if the selection system remains rigidly inflexible and continues
to say no, with rare exception, to a particular group. The
danger is, that after a while, the recruiting teams simply go
through the motion and less and less blacks even apply. Keeping
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the adage in mind that success breeds success, it is time for
future state black recruiting to see some success. Recruiters




The Coast Guard urgently needs a careful examina-
tion and redefinition of its selection process for bringing
cadets into the academy and OCS officers into the Coast Guard.
The present selection processes reflect a certain quality of
impenetrability for blacks. This is true because the tradi-
tional weighting factors surrounding what the Coast Guard
defines as "qualified" are not appropriate. They work to
disproportionally exclude blacks from the academy and OCS.
Perhaps most important in redefining the selection
process is the necessity to insure that the future state
selection process is compatible with affirmative action goals
and guidelines. The Coast Guard must get serious and recog-
nize that it cannot reach its established goals for minority
officers unless it does something different. As it stands
now the overemphasis on academic predictors and a merit
selection process combine to practically eliminate all black
applicants from entering the Coast Guard's officer ranks.
Since decisions about selection, training, job
placement, promotion, transfer, and job redesign
all are encompassed by our broadly conceived
system of selection and placement, it should be
clear that differentiation is central to its
effective administration. I shall never cease
to be amazed by those persons who, in the name
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of equal opportunity, advocate undifferentiated
treatment of all persons, men and women, black
and white, old and young, with apparently no
regard for the greater accuracy to be gained
by taking varying factors, depending upon each
person's unique pattern of individuality, into
account. Those who argue in such a vein confuse
valid and useful differentiation with practices
of unfair discrimination. [Dunnette, 1970]
If the Coast Guard is to consider itself an
institution which trains the leaders of tomorrow, then
black leadership must be equitably and fairly included. In
particular, the Coast Guard Academy, which is both elite and
traditional, two elements which traditionally work to the
disadvantage of blacks, has to shed its image of inflexibility.
One academy official in admissions described the
academy as a "unique" institution, absolutely fair to all
candidates, and that no changes to the selection system
were necessary. When asked about affirmative action he
implied that the academy was exempt from affirmative action.
In contrast, a faculty member, Dr. Cheatham, stated that the
admissions process is characterized by rigidity. Relative to
the effort to increase black representation in the cadet corps,
Dr. Cheatham stated that "they (admissions) are trying to do
a non-traditional job with traditional methods. They need to
be innovative" [Cheatham, 1979] . Certainly the subject of
standards for minority evaluation and admission has generated
much controversy. Nevertheless, an active reevaluation of
selection standards is sorely needed if the Coast Guard is





Affirmative action has in effect accomplished
in American industry a reevaluation of concepts,
ideas and employment standards in order to
take in people who were formerly kept out.
[Northrup, 1974]
b. Predictors
In 1969 a U.S. Military Academy study indicated
that the most efficient predictors of black academic perform-
ance would be a specifically weighted formula based entirely
on black grades. The study concluded that regular predictors
are better for predicting white performance than black per-
formance [Hester, 1977]. Golden and Widasky (1976), in
analyzing types of errors in the selection of minority stu-
dents showed that the use of SAT scores and high school rank
resulted in reducing the number of students who would ultimately
fail. But it also increased the number of individuals who
would have passed but were rejected [Hester, 1977] . Hester
concluded that a particularly fine screening selection pro-
cess was detrimental to blacks, as it increased the false
negatives in this group more than in others. The selection
system, according to Hester should not be so fine-tuned as to
reject blacks who are capable of being successful.
However, there is an apparent unwillingness to
take risks with greater numbers of black students at the Coast
Guard Academy (CGA) . The director of admissions, Captain Get-
man, has a real commitment to increasing the number of blacks
at CGA but at the same time wants to maintain the high aca-
demic standards of the academy. As indicated previously, the
selection process at CGA relies heavily on standardized tests.
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Even the 40% whole man concept is contaminated by the influ-
ence of the tests as well as the existence of a natural bias
in the selection system to prefer whites. It is a natural
facet of selection perception to prefer people like oneself
[Blodgett, 1972] and very few black officers serve on the
cadet evaluation board.
One way the standardized tests hurt blacks in
the selection process is, for example, that SAT college
entrance examinations tend to subtly place inner city or
rural South black students at a disadvantage [Nason, 1976]
.
Colleges and universities, when challenged on
the number of black students they have, are
quick to point out the inadequate preparation
of blacks. This condition, coupled with the
institution's dedication to academic excellence
as a goal, cannot help but skew the student
body in favor of the whites. Admissions
officers currently lament this seemingly insolu-
ble dilemma in black admissions; on the one
hand, a directive to increase black admissions
substantially, and on the other hand, the direc-
tive to maintain and improve the academic
quality of entering classes. As has been
pointed out, there is no question that the
average black precollege education is rela-
tively deficient compared to that of the
average white.
However, the admissions offices often add
to their problem through the selection criteria
used, and thus needlessly deny blacks admission.
The most widely used and heavily weighted admis-
sion criterion for most institutions of higher
education is the SAT. Many admissions offi-
cers admit that, even for white middle-class
applicants, the SAT does not effectively predict
future success. However, for blacks, the SAT
is a highly inaccurate predictor of their
ability or potential success in college. This
inaccuracy is based on the fact that the SAT
has been standardized for the traditional
college students and their backgrounds. This
means relatively affluent whites with college
preparatory high school background. It also
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means that the test was standardized on
middle class values, aspirations, and
behavior patterns. Thus, able black
applicants have a severe handicap if
they come from other walks of life and
environments. [Nason, 1976]
c. Special Admissions
The time and circumstances call for the establish-
ment of a special admissions committee at the Coast Guard
Academy to specifically increase black participation. It
should be an experimental program to run for at least six
years, providing for a longitudinal study of the results.
Coupled with this special admissions policy has to be an
adequate support system for these cadets to be maintained
through graduation. (The last time blacks came to the academy
via a special admissions route [1975, 1976] the academy was
not prepared to provide the necessary support and their
rapid departure was considered demonstrative of their failure
only.) Providing for a support system for these cadets has
far reaching implications and will require an academy-wide
effort to help see the program through to success. Remembering
that the future state is a period one to three years hence,
some of the parameters for success include:
1) Making a special effort to increase their technical and
interpersonal competence, if necessary.
2) Carefully monitor their academic progress. Conduct
informal meetings between black cadets and faculty.
3) Insure black and white cadets are being trained via
their leadership curriculum to understand affirmative action.
This may require special training for battalion officers.
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4) Establish a special assistant to the superintendent to
assist and coordinate the support efforts of minority stu-
dents. (Perhaps this billet could be established using OMB
money specifically designated to enhance minority representa-
tion in the Coast Guard.)
5) Insure that each department at the Academy has affirmative
action objectives.
6) Provide the faculty and staff the necessary training so
they do not resist this change.
The affirmative goal at the Academy for its black cadets has
to be a graduation goal. A recruitment goal alone is insuffi-
cient.
As for maintaining credibility, if the Coast Guard
did a study it would find thatmost of the elite schools (e.g.,
Harvard, Dartmouth, MIT, Stanford, etc.) perform affirmative
action without any loss of credibility. If anything, they
probably enhance their credibility.
A special selection committee should also be
screeening applications from blacks to OCS . One important task
it would face would be to determine valid criteria in order to
establish minimum cut-off scores which are still indicative
of successful performance as a Coast Guard officer. This may
take years of experimental study and will require risk on the
part of the Coast Guard. Establishing validity in the OCS
selection process will at least help to eliminate the current
situation which produces negative effects when it becomes
"known" that blacks were selected from below the (arbitrary)
cutoff for OCS selection. While increasing the number of blacks
through OCS the Coast Guard will also have to insure that the
"ideology of dif ferentness" which unfortunately exists, to
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some degree, between academy and OCS graduates does not
limit their upward mobility. The extension and integration
process should not screen out blacks who are otherwise
qualified. OCS will have to build in a support system
compatible with affirmative action goals. The Coast Guard
must also encourage and reward its commanding officers to
nominate more black enlisted. This may require commanding
officers to more actively participate in preparing and
developing some of their black enlisted educationally prior
to their applying to OCS.
And finally, how many black officers is enough?
The answer lies in the fact that affirmative action is not
a matter of wanting only just so many blacks. The esta-
blished goals should be looked upon as minimums because the
circumstances demand an acceleration of black selection.
For purposes of illustration, if a four year college was to
raise its percentage of minorities from 4 to 15 percent,
one-quarter of the incoming freshman class must be minority
to do it in two years, 4 5 percent to do it in one year
[Schelling, 1978]
.
In general, the Coast Guard must be willing to
take risks with some black applicants and also expect and
accept a higher attrition rate among blacks during the
affirmative action years. In taking risks we may learn
more about the weaknesses of the present selection system
and ultimately achieve a fairer selection system.
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A wise society will act to change its
institutions without destroying them in




First and foremost, an affirmative action strategy
needs to be a part of the officer assignment process. The
position of assigning more blacks to visible operational
jobs as opposed to recruiting or staff jobs in headquarters
is gaining support. However, certain other assignment
practices compatible with affirmative action principles
could be undertaken. The numbers of blacks assigned to
advanced training (e.g. postgraduate school, Naval War
College, etc.) and command positions should be examined.
(This relates to selection practices as well since many
assignments occur as a result of selection board decisions.)
These practices, similar to recruiting could be tied to
goals and timetables.
a. A Measuring Technique
One technique, a measuring tool to help reduce
institutional discrimination, was developed and studied
by Peter E. Nordlie et al. [1974] . This measuring tool
requires a comparison between the actual number of personnel
actions of a certain type - assignment to command position,
for example - with the "expected number" for a particular
group if there was only chance variation. In the Nordlie
Study, fewer blacks were assigned to command position
(U.S. Army) than the expected number based on the proportion
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of blacks among those eligible. Former Secretary of Defense
for Equal Opportunity, H. Minton Francis, expressed that
"it is that kind of hard to explain difference which exem-
plifies what we mean by institutional racism" [Air Force
Times, 10 May 1976]. The Coast Guard, in its approach to
assignments to command or advanced and special training,
must be wary of the effects of those assignments on the
black officer population. Incorporating a technique similar
to the Nordlie instrument on the officer assignment process
would be a step in the right direction,
b. Standards
One other consideration in future state assign-
ment policy and practice centers on the attribute of
fairness . This attribute is not a normally examined qualifi-
cation for any assignment as it is difficult to assess.
Nevertheless, it deserves particular attention and priority
in the assignment of an officer to a critical, influential
billet affecting other people's career paths. Examples of
these billets include assignments as commanding officers,
assignment detailers, personnel officers, etc.
One option to test fairness would be to screen
an officer's behavior as to whom he promotes, whom he
assigns to training, how he administers non- judicial punish-
ment, etc., to determine if any trend of bias or impartiality
exists. Another option would be to administer a standardized





a. Fully Qualified vs Best Qualified
No officer should be promoted who is not compe-
tent or qualified for the duties inherent of the next rank.
However the more subjective distinction between "fully
qualified" and "best qualified" may be too exclusionary
for promoting some black officers fairly. Rear Admiral
R.H. Wood, USCG, has stated that "there is still a defensive
reliance upon 'standards' and a strong position about not
intervening in the 'system '...I think that perhaps we should
be looking at such devices as direct commissioning (of
minorities) and making certain that when a number of
candidates are 'qualified' that an argument for 'best
qualified 1 is not being used in reality as an excuse for
continuing the long term discrimination which has existed
for so many years" [G-A/83 Coast Guard Memorandum dated
19 Dec. 1978]. The evidence is fairly strong that perform-
ance ratings of blacks by whites may not accurately reflect
the quality of their performance. Studies [Hamner, Kim,
Baird, & Bigoness, 1976; Richards & Jaffee, 1972; Parker,
1976] point out that black performance is often undervalued
[Ford & Bagot, 1978]
.
In the future state the Coast Guard affirmative
action strategy should include the promotion of all black
officers who are fully qualified. This policy is needed to
insure that every attempt is being made to achieve a better
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balance in the higher ranks. There may be some initial diffi-
culty with working out the mechanics of this policy in the
promotion system but this can be worked out. Most people
will be willing to accommodate some degree of perceived
unfairness, temporarily, if they belive it is in the interest
of fairness and equity in the organization in the long term.
Characterizing this policy as "reverse discrimination" is
only avoiding the responsibility to implement changes and
accommodate affirmative action goals. Affirmative action
requires top leadership to take strong action stances and
change certain priorities to insure affirmative action goals
are reached.
b. A Management Information System
One difficulty for upper management in the Coast
Guard in assessing the total picture related to black upward
mobility is that they lack an adequate management information
system. Statistics concerning promotion and other important
areas on blacks are difficult to locate, perhaps because in
some instances the Coast Guard does not keep them. Regardless,
decision-makers and policy-makers in the Coast Guard must be
aware of the complete set of facts on black officer progress.
The "eyes wide open" definition of affirmative action applies.
Thus, statistics concerning blacks' fitness reports, promotions,
extensions, integration, attrition, etc., must be made easily
available, not spread out in various Coast Guard divisions and
locations, or unrecorded. The Coast Guard needs a consolidated
report which reports out on the various programs each year by
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race, not by minority. The reporting of information on how
black officers are faring is vital to affirmative action.
c. Fitness Report
Moreover, the fitness report form used in the
Coast Guard for evaluating officers needs to better reflect
the performance of officers on how they develop and train
black officers whom they evaluate. An examination of approxi-
mately 200 sanitized (names removed) fitness reports on lieu-
tenant commanders and commanders in the Coast Guard revealed
that the specific comment required on the fitness report con-
cerning EEO responsibilities was essentially a pro forma
statement - LCDR or CDR complies with the EEO




A final consideration in the future state promo-
tion policy is the issue of validity. The legal requirements
[EEO acto of 1972 and the most recent guideline on employee
selection procedures, 1978] indicate that methods of selection,
assignment and promotion must be validated if they screen out
minorities or women at a greater rate than others.
7 . Civil Rights Training
In the effort to measure black progress in
recent years little attention has been paid
to white progress toward acceptance of a
racially diverse society. [Dreyfuss and
Lawrence, 1979]
Civil rights training in the Coast Guard is keyed
toward improving race relations. It has significant impact
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on the organizational climate and the missions of the Coast
Guard. It is also critical to the support of a future state
Coast Guard affirmative action program. Important in this
future effort will be the continuing need to focus attention
on institutional racism and individual prejudice and bias.
Race relations education and training in general is
perhaps at a crossroad. Its value has been questioned, and
the many techniques and methods associated with it have not
necessarily proved effective. In addition, evaluation studies
and standards have been less than adequate in many instances.
Finally, some of the major problems faced by practitioners
in the field have been a factor:
1) A lack of institutional support (i.e. , commitment of
upper management)
.
2) A lack of sufficiently long education/training periods
with allowances for incubation time.
3) A high level of white resistance to full participation.
[Hayles, 1977]
"High priority needs include well developed links between
practice, evaluation and research (basic, applied, and theoreti-
cal) . Race relations education/training should be evaluated
on the basis of the acquisition, appropriate use, and refine-
ment of behaviors which contribute to harmonious inter-ethnic
relations. While looking at the number of people of color
hired, trained, and promoted provides data appropriate for
evaluating programs aimed at reducing institutional racism,
more attention must be given to the inter-ethnic behaviors





In the effort to reduce institutional racism and
individual negative behaviors in the Coast Guard officer
corps, a more effective training format is required. Atten-
tion to changing the behaviors of Coast Guard officers in
general to reflect more rational attitudes toward those people
who are perceived as "different" is needed. Just as Douglas
McGregor challenges managers, in the Human Side of Enterprise
(1960) , to question their basic assumptions they hold toward
the people they lead (such as the assumption that the average
person dislikes work, has little ambition, needs to be con-
trolled and directed, even threatened to perform satisfac-
torily) , the Coast Guard must offer its officers appropriate
training which challenges their basic assumptions about differ-
ences between people with different skin color. "The chances
of keeping American Society from coming unglued depend to
no small degree on overcoming irrational attitudes toward
the colors of our fellow human beings" [Ehrlich, 1977]
.
White officers must begin to understand the cur-
rent dynamics of racism. Dr. Price Cobbs, a San Francisco
psychiatrist and management consultant for large corporations
has said that "racism is alive and well... the sublety of the
New Racism makes it no less real. A primary manifestation
of this is the perception that white middle and top managers
have about blacks. We are dealing with a range of preconscious
assumptions about the relative competence of blacks, about
the intelligence of blacks. You run into good, well-motivated
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people who think they are fair, who feel they have turned
around attitudes and beliefs of ten to fifteen years ago but
who continue to view blacks in a deficit model: 'less than, 1
'not as good as, 1 ' if we could only do so-and-so to bring
them up to speed.
* If you look back much of what passed for
benign race relations was some kind of social comfort on the
part of whites who were dealing with blacks. There are many
whites who can be comfortable socially but who don't have
any idea of the depth and degree of their remaining negative
assumptions about people who are different" [Dreyfuss and
Lawrence, 1979]
.
To help eliminate this entrenched subtle form of
racism which Dr. Cobbs describes, the Coast Guard training
format must include a thorough attack on the myths of racism.
Even the concept of race should be explored. Paul Ehrlich,
in The Race Bomb (1977) , vehemently and articulately diffuses
the many myths embedded in racism and clarifies that there
are no biological races. The common division of races (black,
white, and yellow) are arbitrary divisions which have no
validity. "In short, races have a social reality that is
seen by the ignorant as a biological reality and associated
with a variety of prejudices about inferiority and superiority"
[Ehrlich, 1977] . Ehrlich also debates the race-IQ question





Future state training must also include an empha-
sis on reducing the perceived threat of affirmative action
to white officers. This emphasis, as well as other already-
cited, needs to appear in more than present state civil rights
training efforts. The Coast Guard needs to use all the credi-
table avenues for teaching civil rights training. Civil rights
training must be viewed in the larger context of leadership
training. For example, the Coast Guard leadership school,
influential in affecting the attitudes of officers, must not
disregard equal opportunity and affirmative action issues.
The senior officer curriculum (commanders and above) especially
should include a concentrated portion on affirmative action.
Besides examining basic assumptions, a thorough analysis of
the equal opportunity statistics in the Coast Guard and a com-
plete explanation/discussion on affirmative action, including
the legal aspects, should be undertaken. The junior officer
course should include, for both white and black officers, a
concentration on examining the consequences of racial atti-
tudes and developing skills in how to deal with people of all
skin colors and ethnic backgrounds. This would be a human
relations approach, not a race relations approach.
c. Mentors
Another future state training consideration should
include developing the concept of mentors for blacks. With
rare exception, leaders are socialized by mentors. Rosen and
Turner (1971) provide support for the role of the mentor or
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buddy system as a way to integrate minorities into an organi-
zation. To be integrated more fully, blacks need inclusion
into the informal system of the officer corps. They need to
know how to make a "psychological contract" with the Coast
Guard. This means learning the norms, standards, history, and
especially the politics of the organization. It also means
knowing what paths are necessary to success, and where the
stumbling blocks are. And finally, the black needs to under-
stand which behaviors produce success. A mentor can be of
significant help in enabling a black officer to ground himself
comfortably in the informal system. But first, more senior
Coast Guard officers need to be willing to reach out to younger
black officers and take on the role of a mentor, otherwise
known as an "agent of growth." The maintenance of black
officers' growth is as important as their entry into the
Coast Guard.
However, give that a recent report indicated that
many senior officers, above the rank of lieutenant commander,
may be fairly insular in their thinking and that bias is more
likely to occur in the senior people of the service [LT Williams,
1979; RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979], it may be appropriate to
retrain our senior people in their views toward society.
Specific programs besides leadership school might include
Coast Guard sponsored senior management conferences and
continuing education seminars. Perhaps then the mentor pro-
cess, so vital to upward mobility, will become more of a




In sum, affirmative action needs to be supported
by appropriate training. The civil rights training the offi-
cers receive should be able to challenge and unmask the
irrational theories that are carried around by each officer
about his concepts of race. This training and other proposed
training is needed to prevent a polarization of attitudes
between blacks and whites which can occur if the organization
is not adequately prepared for affirmative action.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This research project is about affirmative action in
the Coast Guard officer ranks and an organizational change
process to influence its direction. I have suggested ways
to increase black officer representation in the Coast
Guard. The following is a summary of those recommendations
A. THE COMMANDANT
1. The Commandant must take a more active, positive
and personal approach to bring affirmative action to force
in the officer corps for black officers. He must provide
emotional support of affirmative action which is evident
to blacks and whites in the Coast Guard.
B. THE ACADEMY AND OCS
1. Establish a special admissions committee to select
qualified black officer candidates. This should be an
experimental program to run for at least six to ten years.
Include built-in support systems which account for affirma-
tive action goals and objectives beyond the initial entry
point.
2. The Coast Guard Academy should establish a special
billet for an assistant to the Superintendent to assist and
coordinate the support efforts for black students matricula-




1. The recruiting elements for black officers should care-
fully examine their assumptions about the size and quality




Expand the recruiting coverage to include black
junior college graduates who may be interested and qualified
for the academy.
3. The recruiting effort should include a more personal-
ized approach from senior Coast Guard officials. On occasion,
a District Commander, the superintendent, the dean, or other
admirals and captains could become directly involved in
recruiting black officers, either through personal telephone
calls or visits to the candidates' homes.
D. THE COAST GUARD
1. The Coast Guard's approach to equal opportunity and
affirmative action should be a comprehensive systems
approach which merges affirmative action and equal oppor-
tunity into the larger context of a human resource manage-
ment system.
2. The Coast Guard should concentrate on developing
its officers to be attitudinally prepared to understand
and accept a dramatic increase in black officer
participation.
a. Include equal opportunity and affirmative
action issues in the officer leadership school curriculum;
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they should be especially emphasized in the senior officer
curriculum.
3. The Coast Guard should identify clearly the subtle
hurdles and barriers which operate to exclude blacks dis-
proportionately from employment practices in the officer
corps.
4. The Coast Guard should institute a feedback system
for gathering information on the racial climate in the
officer corps to assist in determining future actions and
strategy.
5. The Coast Guard should build into its budget the
appropriate commitment to support increased affirmative
action.
6. The Coast Guard should establish an ad hoc committee,
similar to the Professional Military Training Advisory
Committee (PMTAC) , to meet regularly to offer guidance to
the Coast Guard in improving its equal opportunity and
affirmative action posture.
7. The Coast Guard should carefully examine and re-
define its officer selection procedures more compatibly
with federal affirmative action requirements.
8
.
The Coast Guard should develop a management infor-
mation system which provides complete statistics on black
officer progress into and in the Coast Guard.
9. The Coast Guard should include a change to its
fitness report system which provides for a more specific
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way to elucidate comments on the equal opportunity portion
of the form.
10. In future civil rights training, a format should
be created which vigorously challenges the basic assumptions
held by officers surrounding their concept of race.
11. The Coast Guard should develop an affirmative
action policy for future officer assignments.
12. The Coast Guard should promote all black officers
who are fully qualified.
I have argued the rationale for these recommendations
throughout this paper. While it is recognized that they
are not easy to accomplish, in my judgment they are necessary
if the Coast Guard is to remain independent in controlling
its own human resource policies. Although I have discussed
affirmative action in particular, the focus of the paper is
on the integration of affirmative action into the Coast
Guard's human resource management system. It is recognized
that the Coast Guard has other "human" problems and chal-
lenges besides equal opportunity and affirmative action.
Organizational change for the "human" organization is not
just for equal opportunity, it is for other areas as well.
In addition, as noted earlier, equal opportunity and
affirmative action need to be merged with other processes




As this review of Coast Guard personnel practices demon-
strates, the present equal opportunity policies of zealously
guarding against inequality will likely add many years to
accomplishing the goal of equitable black representation
in the Coast Guard officer ranks. No doubt, in accelerating
the process, there may be difficulties with implementing
dramatic affirmative action change in the Coast Guard, such
as increasing the perceived threat to white officer advance-
ment. Complaints of reverse discrimination may well occur.
The Coast Guard must be prepared to address these problems
through appropriate education and manpower planning. Most
Coast Guard officers may well be willing to accept increased
selection programs for black officers for a temporary period
if they felt they were necessary to produce equity in the
not too distant future.
In adopting an increased affirmative action posture, the
Coast Guard must present its new policies as a set of
sequential steps which over time will increase the repre-
sentation of blacks in the officer ranks. Although
temporary, these steps would include, among others, expanded
black recruitment, expanded admission to the academy and
OCS, expanded training of white officers as mentors, as well
as skill and status enhancing assignments for black
officers. For example, if greater numbers of blacks attend
the Coast Guard Academy over the next four years, the
development of a wider pool of potential mentors for blacks
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should be emphasized four years from now as more black
cadets begin to graduate. But, in time, a formal program
for training mentors will no longer be necessary as blacks
are integrated into the officer ranks more fully. Affirma-
tive action goals need built-in support systems to insure
success. A recruitment goal is insufficient by itself.
Other goals and objectives need to be established to support
affirmative action after blacks enter the various officer
programs
.
In the long term black officers must have their equal
chance of becoming Commandant of the Coast Guard. Therefore,
if blacks represent about 11% of the population, the Coast
Guard needs to insure that it has a fair representation of
black Coast Guard captains twenty to thirty years from now.
The one black captain in the Coast Guard today may have as
equal of a chance as any other captain of becoming Commandant
but blacks have about a one in 300 chance of becoming
Commandant, as there are approximately 300 captains in the
Coast Guard. If we have 300 captains twenty to thirty years
from now we should also have approximately 30 black captains.
Then maybe we will begin to see black admirals, and a black
Commandant
.
My vision of affirmative action in the Coast Guard is
that in ten to thirty years from now it will have changed
the Coast Guard's nearly total white image in a manner that
was not only fair, but increased the effectiveness of the
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organization at the same time. I don't believe you can do
affirmative action in bits and pieces and be satisfied with
the rate of social change that produces negligible results.
Nor do I think the government will tolerate the dispro-
portionate black representation in the officer ranks much
longer. However, an effective, well implemented affirmative
action strategy is probably the best defense against any
imposed solution by outside sources.
In Chapters III and IV I presented and used an organiza-
tion development model. The model is useful in defining a
problem and developing a strategy to assist in achieving
goals determined to solve the problem. The model argues for
establishing clearly defined organizational conditions; the
present state, the future state, and the transition state.
One important reason for defining the present state and the
future state is that it locates the transition state, i.e.,
it permits the manager to set this crucial period of time
and state of affairs into a distinct perspective.
This thesis is an illustration of the use of part of
the model. I have defined a present state, and envisioned
a future state of Coast Guard affirmative action for black
officers. Both of these states were perhaps underdef ined,
and the transtiion state remains to be considered. The
Coast Guard needs to articulate its own present and future
states, and then determine a transition state which can
effectively act as a "roadmap" to its desired future.
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Establishing goals is part of policy planning, and
clearly articulating a strategy to achieve those goals is
critical to their success. The Beckhard and Harris model
is one way the Coast Guard can focus on affirmative action
for black officers and develop a viable strategy. A central
part of that strategy which keys on the transition state is
pointed out by Beckhard and Harris:
We define a large system change strategy as a
plan defining what intervention to make when,
by whom, and at what time in order to move the
organization to a state where it can optimally
transform needs into results in a social
environment that nurtures people's worth and
dignity. Managerially , this means defining
the kinds of activities that need to be
induced and the kinds of expertise that
need to be brought to bear to help with the
change; identifying people in the organization
who need to become committed to the change;
establishing a timetable and specifying
priorities of changes and practices in proce-
dures, reweards, policies, and behavior;
establishing a system of evaluating progress
toward a new state; and providing education in
skills needed to both operate in the new
condition and manage the change.
[Beckhard & Harris, 1977]
If the Coast Guard carefully defines what its desired future
is to be relative to black officer participation it has a
better chance of achieving it. Defining the transition
state establishes the key processes for the change strategy
compatible with that future state.
I believe it is time for change. If blacks are to
participate more fully in the Coast Guard over the next
thirty years it will require significant affirmative action
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CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY STATEMENT
Transportation vitally affects the social and economic development of our
urban and rural communities and influences the mobility patterns and
provides employment and recreational opportunities for millions of
Americans. It is the policy of the Department of Transportation, in
carrying out its programs, that there shall be no discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin or age. There shall be vigorous
affirmative action to assure full, fair and representative participation of
minorities and women.
Minorities and women shall be involved actively in the formulation of
transportation policies, and shall participate fully in the Department's
decision-making process. Equal employment must become a reality in this
Department, expressed by substantial increases in the number of minorities
and women at all grade levels in the DOT work force. The Department shall
aggressively enforce contract compliance requirements and nondiscrimina-
tion provisions applicable to all Federally assisted programs. Businesses
and firms owned by minorities and women will receive an equitable share of
the procurement arising from the Department's programs.
The implementation of this policy shall be a top priority. I shall insist that it
be thoroughly understood, rigorously followed and recognized as an integral
part of every program of this Department. I shall hold the administrators,
managers and supervisors at every level in the Department accountable for
the implementation of this policy and the full realization of these goals. The
Department of Transportation will be a leader in the provision of equal
opportunity for all Americans.'
vjo«J? C«&~~
Brock Adams
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FY-1989 Special Studies; suggested topic
Deputy Chief, Office of Civil Rights
Chief, Plans Evaluation Division
(a) Planning and Programming Manual (CG-411)
(b) Your Memo 5010 of 15 FEB 1979
1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) , the following
suggested topic is submitted for analytical studv in FY
1980:
a. Subject of Study Proposal
The examination into the feasibility of creating a
Coast Guard "Organizational Development" program.
b. Background for Study Proposal
The Coast Guard treasures its traditions, but
advances in technology and other problems of the
closing decades of the twentieth century point in •
new directions, for which tradition offers small
guidance. Rampant changes in social values and
the composition of our human resources, necessitate
that a servicewide program of "prevention" be
examined and identified, in order to gain optimum
usage of our most important asset—our people.
c. Definition of Problems
District and Unit Commanders are faced with radical
departures in the social composition of the Coast
Guard today and tomorrow versus yesterday. Minority
and female members continue to expand in numbers and
in range of assignments and responsibilities.
Although various "human" or "soft" programs are now
in existence and available to Commanders, they are
primarily directed toward the individual on a "put
out the fire" basis. Programs under the following













2. It is recommended that efforts be made to consolidate
existing people programs into one program identified as
"organizational development" wherein Commanders would be
able to deal with the following goals:
a. Increased awareness by all personnel of the impor-
tance of human goals and the need for the highest standards
of personal conduct.
b. An improved state of unit readiness.
c. Improved communication at all levels in the chain
of command
.
d. Improved image of the Coast Guard as a professional
organization which recognizes the worth and dignity of the
individual and his or her family.
e. Improved leadership and human resource management
practices at all levels.
f. Improved career and job satisfaction.
g. Total involvement of the chain of command in all
efforts to improve the safety, productivity and effective-
ness of its human resources.
h. Insurance of uniformity and equality in application
of discipline, military justice and administrative practices.
i. Increased ability of all Coast Guard personnel to
recognize the symptoms and dangers of alcohol and drug abuse
which lead to reduced performance, accidents, disciplinary
infractions, health and family problems, injuries and death.
j . Development of a Human Goals Action Plan by all
commands
.
k. Improved retention of quality personnel.
3. This type of program is currently employed by the U.S.
Navy, under the heading "Human Resources Management",
involving some 1800 full-time HRM Specialists, trained in the
behavioral sciences by the Navy at existing Navy schools.
It is primarily directed towards command improvement and
productivity rather than isolated individual satisfaction.




4 . Anticipated Resources Required
Staff: - One 0-5/6
One 0-3/4
One E-6/7
Contractual: None contemplated - the U.S. Navy has
already researched this matter thoroughly via a myriad
of contractors - their costs to date exceed $6 million.
The Coast Guard can obtain all required data from
BUPERS 61/62, Washington, D.C.
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